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Adults, those over the age of eighteen, are presumed competent and therefore enjoy a 
certain level of autonomous decision-making free from outside intrusion.  Those who 
have not reached the age of majority, on the other hand, are presumed incompetent, and 
thus require the aid of parents or guardians to assist in the decision-making process. 
Recent studies in adolescent development suggest that certain individuals, though not yet 
eighteen, have the requisite competence to make informed, autonomous medical 
decisions.  In turn, some states have acknowledged the mature minor doctrine, which is 
based on the seemingly simple principle that minors who demonstrate a sufficient level of 
maturity ought to have their choices respected independent of third parties. 
Though many agree that certain adolescents reason on a level equal to that of 
young adults, debate surrounds the conclusion that minors should be permitted to consent 
to or refuse medical treatment especially when the choice has life or death consequences.  
A further complication exists when the decision is based upon religious beliefs.   
 To date, the relevant literature focuses on parents' religious beliefs that influence 
medical decision making for their minor children, and minors' maturity to decide medical 
care for themselves.  Although some courts and scholars have addressed these topics in 
the same document, little attention has been paid to the unique circumstances involved 
 iv
when adolescents attempt to refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based 
upon their expressed religious beliefs.  Failing to address the religious maturity of the 
minors in question creates the possibility that they will be permitted to die for beliefs that 
are not truly their own. 
The thesis of this paper is that under these circumstances practitioners must 
inquire into the authenticity of the religious beliefs of the adolescents.  Because the 
religious upbringing of children is directed by the beliefs of their parents and ministers it 
is necessary to ensure that the adolescents have developed their own underlying and 
enduring aims and values.  Thus, these adolescents should have the burden to 
demonstrate clearly and convincingly that they understand their beliefs, as well as the 
consequences of the medical decision. Only then can practitioners be sure that the 
minors, independent of third party influence or coercion, have the ability to make an 
autonomous decision to die for those beliefs in line with their true sense of well-being. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Julie, a seventeen-year-old girl, lies awake in her freshman dorm room grappling with her faith.  
She spent the day at the hospital with her roommate who was diagnosed with mononucleosis.  
The roommate was bedridden for several days before she finally decided to go to the emergency 
room.  The physicians decided to keep her overnight for observation, but felt that she would be 
ready to go home the next day with proper medication.   
Julie’s family was actively involved in the Christian Scientist faith, and they did not 
believe in conventional medical treatment.  She was brought up to believe that illness is not 
caused by viruses and bacteria, but rather by not being spiritually whole with God.1  Despite her 
traditional beliefs, Julie feared that she would “catch” the disease.  She spoke with her parents 
earlier in the day and they told her that mono is the “kissing disease,” and that the roommate’s 
insistence on behaving impurely distanced herself from God resulting in her suffering.   
Julie had no trouble reconciling her parents’ statements with her roommate’s illness.  
After all, she was always telling Julie about her late night partying and the different boys she had 
been with.  But Julie did not go to parties.  She had never “made out” with any boys, nor did she 
plan to.  She thought she felt whole with God.   
What troubled Julie was that the physicians at the hospital told her that because of the 
close proximity in the dorm rooms, she was at risk for having mono, and should be tested.  Julie 
informed them of her religious beliefs, and declined the test.  The physician respected her 
                                                 
1 Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 AM. 
J. L. & MED. 269, 271 (2003). 
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decision, but told her of the potential dangers of untreated mononucleosis.  Julie laid awake in 
bed, wondering what she would do if she did have mono.   
At school she learned of many different religious beliefs to which she had never before 
been exposed.  She questioned whether her beliefs were more or less correct than any of her 
friends who worshipped in different ways.2  She wanted to discuss her confusion with her 
parents, but knew she could not.  They were against her going to a secular college and warned 
her about the dangers of questioning her beliefs.  Perhaps these questions would make her 
unwhole with God and susceptible to mono.  She knew she did not want to die, and fell into a 
restless sleep.   
Now imagine Shannon, but instead of lying awake, she is lying in a diabetic coma hours 
before her death.  Shannon is a sixteen-year-old home-schooled member of the Faith Tabernacle 
religion.  Like Julie, her family does not believe in medical treatment.  When she began feeling 
sick a few days earlier, she and her family began praying that she would get better.  When 
Shannon was ten, her nine-year old brother died from complications arising from an ear 
infection.  Her parents prayed continuously, but apparently God’s plan was not for her brother to 
live.  Maybe she questioned God’s plan for herself, but her parents assured her that with enough 
prayer she could overcome her illness.  She did not.  
While Julie’s story is a fictional account, Shannon’s is not.  Following Shannon’s death, 
her parents were tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter and endangering the welfare of 
a child.  In their defense, they argued that Shannon was a mature minor who made the decision to 
forego medical treatment on her own. 3    
                                                 
2 See infra Part V discussing religious development in minors. 
3 See infra Part IV detailing the case of Shannon Nixon.  
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The so-called mature minor doctrine is based on a seemingly simple principle; that is, 
minors who demonstrate a sufficient level of maturity ought to have their choices respected 
independent of third parties.  It is well settled that adults, i.e., those over the age of eighteen, are 
presumed competent and therefore enjoy a certain level of autonomous decision-making free 
from outside intrusion.  Those who have not reached the age of majority, on the other hand, are 
presumed incompetent, and thus require the aid of parents or guardians to assist in the decision-
making process. 
Based on recent studies in adolescent development, various scholars have argued that 
certain individuals, though not yet eighteen, have the requisite competence to make informed, 
autonomous choices.  Thus, the argument goes, their decisions should be respected to the same 
degree as those who have achieved the arbitrary age of majority.   
Though many agree that certain adolescents reason on a level equal to that of young 
adults, debate surrounds whether these findings support the conclusion that minors should be 
permitted to consent to or refuse medical treatment especially when the choice has life or death 
consequences.  A further complication exists when the decision is based upon religious beliefs.   
To date, the main body of discourse has focused on one of two things: (1) whether 
parents should be permitted to refuse medical treatment on behalf of their children based upon 
religious objections, and (2) whether minors should be permitted to prove a sufficient level of 
maturity to make medical decisions for themselves.  Though some courts and scholars have 
addressed these topics in the same document, little attention has been paid to the unique 
circumstances involved when both are implicated, as in the cases of Julie and Shannon.4  Failing 
                                                 
4 In all reported cases involving the refusal of medical treatment, the custodial parents shared the same religious 
beliefs as the minors involved. 
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to address the religious integrity of the minors in question creates the possibility that they will 
choose to die for beliefs that are not truly their own.   
This paper will attempt to bridge the current divide.  Part I will detail the legal and ethical 
basis for the presumption that those under the age of eighteen are incompetent to make 
autonomous decisions, particularly medical decisions.  Part II will then delineate those 
circumstances where parental decisional rights concerning their minor children may be limited.  
Part III explores situations where minors are empowered to make medical decisions.  This 
includes statutory exceptions for certain treatment, the abortion context and the common law 
mature minor doctrine.  Part IV analyzes the pivotal cases involving both religious and medical 
decision making by adolescents.  The cases reach different results regarding the mature minor 
doctrine in this context leaving the topic ripe for debate.  Part V will then outline the special 
concerns implicated by the religious expression of adolescents and the extent to which this 
expression deserves respect.  It will deal particularly with defining and measuring religious 
integrity in those situations where adolescents seek to refuse medical treatment based upon 
religious beliefs. 
This paper will conclude that when adolescents attempt to refuse life-saving or sustaining 
medical treatment based upon religious beliefs, they have the burden to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that they both understand the medical aspects of the decision and have 
beliefs that are central to their conception of well-being.  Only then can practitioners determine 
that the minor, independent of undue third party influence or coercion, has the ability to make an 
autonomous decision to risk dying for those beliefs.   
 4
  
 
I. PRESUMPTIONS: MINORS AND MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
 
A. THE COMMON LAW AGE OF MAJORITY AND THE 26TH AMENDMENT 
 
In the eyes of the law there is something magical about the stroke of midnight on the eve of 
one’s eighteenth birthday.  It is at this point that individuals are considered to become legally 
recognizable adults5 with all the rights – except perhaps drinking alcohol – that stem there from.  
Prior to the passage of the last second of one’s seventeenth year, individuals are plagued with the 
assumption that they lack the “maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment necessary to 
make life’s difficult decisions.”6   
 As early as the signing of the Magna Carta, the common law age of majority was twenty-
one.7  Before this time individuals aged fourteen or fifteen were commonly held to have adult 
status.  For instance, under Roman Law, the test for adulthood was whether male students had 
“both understanding and judgment as to acts in law;” this ability was presumed to exist by the 
age of fourteen.8   
 At some point during the ninth and tenth centuries in Northern Europe the age of majority 
was set at fifteen.  Interestingly, this age was tied closely to the ability to bear arms.9  As armor 
became increasingly heavy and burdensome in the middle of the thirteenth century, younger 
combatants were unable to perform with enough skill to be effective.  The introduction of 
                                                 
5 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 558 (2000) (noting that 
various rights accrue at different ages, but the age of majority is the baseline at which “presumptive adult legal 
status is attained”). 
6 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
7 T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 22, 26 (1960). 
8 Id. at 25. 
9 Id. at 24-26. 
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knights on horseback added another element of skill that fifteen-year-olds rarely possessed.10  
During feudal times younger males often became squires with the hope that after sufficient 
training they would rise to the level of knight after their twenty-first birthday; the age 
subsequently adopted under the English common law when individuals became free to make 
decisions without the aid of a guardian.11   
 The English brought this common law age of majority to the colonies where it remained, 
and after the Revolution, came under the purview of the States.  Until the passage of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment States retained the authority to set the ages at which to recognize rights of 
citizens.12  Perhaps the right most associated with being an active citizen is the right to vote.13
 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, passed in 1971, lowered 
the age at which citizens have the right to vote in federal and state elections from twenty-one to 
eighteen.14  This naturally begs the question of why those under twenty-one were ever prevented 
from voting.  Was it really because those incapable of riding a horse into combat wearing full 
armor are equally incapable of making intelligent political choices? 
Although this sounds humorous, it was just the sort of question asked by those 
challenging the fact that eighteen-year-olds were being sent into Vietnam,15 yet could not vote on 
the political decision to go to war in the first place.16  The argument for setting a threshold age 
for voting rests on the assumption that “education and an informed understanding of the issues 
                                                 
10 Id. at 27. 
11 Id. at 28-31. 
12 See generally Scott, supra note 5 (discussing various state specific laws regarding the ages at which rights accrue 
to citizens).   
13 Id. at 560 (stating that the “right to vote has long been the defining marker of legal adulthood.” 
14 The Amendment states: “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, 
§ 1. 
15 There is more than subtle irony in the fact that in over one thousand years of human achievement the age of 
majority has been adjusted twice for war-motivated reasons absent an intellectual inquiry into the developmental 
necessity of setting the age as such. 
16 See Scott, supra note 5, at 562-64. 
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are important to political participation in a democracy, and that adults are more likely to meet 
these criteria than children and adolescents.”17  At this time, of course, adulthood began at 
twenty-one. 
 Those in support of the amendment argued that the common law boundary between 
adulthood and childhood did not reflect developmental reality.  They argued that psychological 
maturity is achieved by eighteen,18 such that the presumption of immaturity should not apply to 
those between eighteen and twenty-one.  The Senate committee that ultimately recommended the 
enactment of the amendment was cognizant of this, but also acknowledged that “legal minors 
were treated as adults for the purposes of criminal responsibility and punishment in all states, and 
that many were engaged in adult roles as employees and taxpayers.”19   
 The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment changed the age of majority for most 
exercisable adult rights from twenty-one to eighteen.  Recent scholarship in the healthcare 
setting, however, has challenged the notion that eighteen is a proper guidepost for determining 
the onset of adulthood and the concomitant right to make medical decisions. 
 
 
B. THE ETHICS OF MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
In the medical setting there is a clear divide between the medical decision-making capabilities of 
adults and minors.  At the very core of this divide is the presumption that adults are competent to 
make these decisions while minors are not.20  Minors are “assumed to lack sufficient cognitive 
and conative maturity to craft autonomous health care choices, therefore being deemed legally 
                                                 
17 Id. at 562. 
18 S. REP. NO. 92-26, at 5 (1971). 
19 Scott, supra note 5, at 563. 
20 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices, 
8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 88 (2001) [hereinafter Hartman, Physician Perceptions]. 
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incapable of giving genuine informed consent to medical treatment.”21  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that “most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make 
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or 
treatment.”22
 To understand why minors cannot be trusted to make health care decisions for 
themselves, it is necessary to explore the concept of an autonomous medical decision, and what 
some would argue prevents minors from achieving this ideal.23  Bioethics discourse,24 founded in 
medicine, law, philosophy and religion, asks difficult moral questions and seeks to provide 
“decision-makers with principles to guide them to answers.”25  Rather than starting with 
presumptions regarding age, a bioethical inquiry seeks to justify why minors’ decisions 
regarding medical care should or should not be respected. 
 One of the founding principles of civilized society is that individuals acting in a private 
capacity may not violate the bodily integrity of one another without the other person’s consent.26  
This principle extends to the health care setting where physicians and other practitioners must 
obtain consent from a patient before performing medical procedures.27  Justice Cardozo put it 
                                                 
21 Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical Treatment, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 299 
(2003). 
22 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
23 Whether adults truly achieve this ideal is a matter beyond the scope of this paper. 
24 See generally, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001) 
(detailing the four major principles in bioethics: autonomy; beneficence; nonmaleficence; and justice). 
25 Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine when Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions 
for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) [hereinafter Rosato, Bioethics 
Discourse]. 
26 As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, “no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, 
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).  See also W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 39-42 (5th ed. 1984). 
27 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 114-25 
(1986) (detailing the first reported case of a physician being held liable for failure to obtain consent.  Slater v. Baker, 
95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).  The physician performed an unorthodox procedure to correct a broken leg although 
the patient only consented to standard treatment).  Id. at 116.   
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this way, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”28  Although consent has been 
required for centuries, the notion of informed consent has only existed since the mid-twentieth 
century.29
 Historically, medical care was delivered with the paternalistic understanding that 
physicians knew what was best for their patients.30  Physicians acted in accord with the principle 
of beneficence31 by “preventing harm, removing harm, and doing good.”32  This was best 
accomplished when patients did what they were told.   
From the late 1950s continuing through the early 1970s scholars began to suggest that 
patients be permitted to play a more active role in their medical care.  Jay Katz described the 
clash of these two approaches as follows: 
The conflict created by uncertainties about the extent to which individual and societal 
well-being is better served by encouraging patients’ self-determination or supporting 
physicians’ paternalism is the central problem of informed consent.  This fundamental 
conflict [reflects] a thorough-going ambivalence about human beings’ capacities for 
taking care of themselves and need for caretaking. . . .33
 
                                                                                                                                                             
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1989).   
28 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).     
29 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 125.  The authors cite to Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 
317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) as coining the phrase informed consent. 
30 According to the Hippocratic Oath, which medical school students still often recite at graduation, physicians 
swear to “apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them 
from harm and injustice.”  See Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation And Interpretation, in 
ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (Ousei Temkin & C. Lillian Temkin eds., 1967).  
Certain scholars view this language as “secretive, sexist, paternalistic, and elitist.”  JURIT BERGSMA & DAVID C. 
THOMASMA, AUTONOMY AND CLINICAL MEDICINE 123 (2000). 
31 The principle of beneficence refers to a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others.  BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 260. 
32 EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 53 (1993). 
33 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 126-27.  
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Rather than assuming that physicians know what is best for their patients, the presumption 
became that “competent individuals are better judges of their own good than are others,”34 and as 
such should be permitted to make medical decisions for themselves.35  The idea that individuals 
should be respected36 in their self-determination is encapsulated by the bioethical principle of 
respect for autonomy.   
 From the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule or law) “personal autonomy has come to 
refer to personal self-governance; personal rule of the self by adequate understanding while 
remaining free from controlling interferences by others and from personal limitations that 
prevent choice.”37  That persons are autonomous is rooted in “the liberal Western tradition” that 
emphasizes the “importance of individual freedom and choice, both for political life and for 
personal development.”38  Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma refer to a “fundamental and 
universal moral truth . . . that humans are owed respect for their ability to make reasoned choices 
that are their own and that others may or may not share.”39   
Individuals do not develop personal identities in a vacuum, however.  Indeed, persons are 
“socially embedded” and form identities “within the context of social relationships,” and a 
complex intersection of “social determinants.”40  It is not necessary that a person make decisions 
completely free from influence; rather, autonomous individuals act “freely in accordance with a 
                                                 
34 ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 
29 (1989). 
35 This is an acknowledgment that from the patient’s perspective, health is only one of many values given 
consideration.  Id. at 30. 
36 Respect for persons used throughout this article stems from the Kantian categorical imperative: “act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end 
and never simply as a means.”  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (James W. 
Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1981) (1785).  
37 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 8. 
38 Id. at 7. 
39 PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 32, at 21. 
40 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 24, at 61. 
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self-chosen life plan.”41  In other words, their decisions are not controlled by third parties, but are 
governed by a self conception developed over time in relation to cultural and social 
experiences.42
The principle that one deserves respect as an autonomous person is different than whether 
that person’s decisions should be respected as autonomous. Autonomous individuals can make 
non-autonomous choices, for instance in the presence of “temporary constraints such as 
ignorance or coercion.”43  Informed consent is founded on the idea that if you give competent 
individuals sufficient information, absent coercion, they will in turn utilize that information to 
make an autonomous decision “that they believe will best promote their own well-being as they 
conceive it.”44  The analytical elements of informed consent are: “(1) disclosure; (2) 
comprehension; (3) voluntariness; (4) competence;”45 and (5) some decisional action.46
As the doctrine of informed consent became entrenched in the law disproportionate 
emphasis was placed on disclosure.  Physicians were given the duty to provide certain 
information if they wished to avoid liability for failure to obtain informed consent.47  Generally 
speaking, legal disclosure consists of four categories of information: (1) diagnosis, including the 
medical steps preceding diagnosis; (2) the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment with 
likelihood of success; (3) the probability and severity of risk associated with the treatment in 
question; and (4) feasible alternatives – including non treatment – coupled with their risks, 
                                                 
41 Id. at 58. 
42 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress emphasize that choices must be voluntary, that is, absent controlling 
influences such as coercion or undue manipulation.  Id. at 93-95.  Certain forms of persuasion are permissible to the 
extent that they appeal to the individual’s reason.  Id. at 94. 
43 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 8. 
44 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 30. 
45 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 274.  
46 There is some debate as to how to label the last element.  Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp use “consent,” but 
note that others prefer “decision, shared decisionmaking or collaboration.”  Id. at 274-75.  All would agree that some 
“action,” be it consent or refusal, is required. 
47 Id. at 276.   
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consequences and probabilities of success.48  While disclosure is an important element of 
informed consent, ethically speaking, it is not the most essential.49
For instance, although competence is the fourth element listed, it is really the threshold 
question.50  After all, if the particular patient is deemed incompetent, it is not necessary to 
provide him or her with the information; rather, the information must be provided to a proper 
surrogate decision-maker.51  What then does it mean to be competent to make medical decisions? 
Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock suggest that there are three capacities necessary for 
decision-making competence: “capacities for communication and understanding of information, 
capacities for reasoning and deliberation, and capacity to have and apply a set of values.”52  
These capacities are necessary to ensure that the individual’s choice is truly in line with his or 
her conception of well-being,53 and thus deserving of respect as autonomous.  Persons can be 
deemed incompetent, and thus have their decisions set aside, where an inquiry indicates that they 
are “mistaken about what will best satisfy their underlying and enduring aims and values,” 
and/or they “fail to accept or choose in accord with objective ideals of the person and personal 
well-being.”54     
                                                 
48 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 356-57 (4th ed. 2001). 
49 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 276.  The authors suggest that there is “nothing about the nature of an 
informed consent per se that requires disclosure as a necessary condition, and certainly nothing that would orient its 
meaning around disclosure.”  Id..  The authors make a distinction between true informed consent, known as 
autonomous authorization, and merely effective informed consent that meets legal or institutional guidelines.  Id. at 
280. 
50 See Id. at 287 (referring to competence as the “gatekeeping concept”).  Only competent persons are capable of 
autonomous authorization. 
51 See generally BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34 (discussing both the importance of selecting a proper surrogate 
and once the surrogate is chosen, how decisions should be made regarding the incompetent individual). 
52 Id. at 23-25. 
53 Defining an individual’s conception of well-being, or what is good, is philosophically complex.  Buchanan and 
Brock summarize three theories of well-being: 1) “hedonist theories hold that the only thing that is good for a person 
is having conscious experiences of a specified, positive sort;” 2) preference or desire satisfaction, which holds that 
“what is good for persons is for them to have their desires or preferences satisfied to the maximum extent possible 
over their lifetimes;” and 3) objective list or ideal theory, which denies that “happiness and preference satisfaction 
are all there is to personal well-being.” BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 31-34 
54 Id. at 34. 
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Recall, however, that adults are presumed to have this capacity, and a full blown inquiry 
into an adult’s competence will only be triggered by peculiar circumstances that indicate to a 
health care professional that the adult’s competence should be questioned.55  In practice, 
therefore, unless clear and convincing evidence is supplied to the contrary, adults possess “an 
unqualified liberty interest . . . to [consent to or] refuse any and all medical treatments.”56  Those 
under the age of eighteen, on the other hand, are presumed to lack capacity sufficient to rise to 
the level of competence requisite for autonomous authorization. 
  Returning to the capacities suggested by Buchanan and Brock, there is a real question, 
and limited empirical data, regarding the ability of minors to understand and communicate about 
the semantic content of treatment discussions.57  While it may be unnecessary for patients to 
truly grasp the technical medical data, it is essential that they understand the “impact that 
treatment alternatives will have on their lives.”58  Some argue that because minors have limited 
life experience, their decisions are “not part of a well-conceived life plan.”59
  Importantly, minors “may give inadequate weight to the effects of decisions on their 
future interests, and also fail to anticipate future changes in their values that may be predictable 
by others.”60  Minors tend to place greater emphasis on the present effects of a decision than 
                                                 
55 Buchanan & Brock suggest that this presumption is supported by the values of individual well-being and self-
determination: they state “first, that a person’s important interest in making significant decisions about his or her 
life, specifically about health care, provides strong support for this general presumption and, second, that adults’ 
health care decisions are in the large majority of cases reasonably in accord with their well-being . . ..”  Id. at 22.  A 
patient’s refusal of a physician’s recommended course of treatment may give rise to an inquiry, but is not itself 
evidence of incompetence.  Id. at 58. 
56 Harvey, supra note 21, at 303. 
57 Id. at 219 (citing Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 
9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412 (1978). 
58 Id. at 219. 
59 See LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS, CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING 61 (1998). 
60 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 221. 
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long-term consequences,61 are more susceptible to peer pressure,62 and studies have shown that 
minors participate in “unhealthy risk-taking” more often than do adults.63   
Taken together, these claims lend themselves to the notion that minors need a “protected 
period in which to develop ‘enabling virtues’ (habits, including the habit of self control), which 
advance their lifetime autonomy and opportunities.”64  In other words, time to develop a true 
conception of well-being that would be reflected in a competent decision deserving respect as 
autonomous.  As Elizabeth Scott has observed, “this account of childhood leads quite naturally to 
the conclusion that children must be subject to adult authority, and that the deeply ingrained 
political values of autonomy, responsibility, and liberty simply do not apply to them.”65
Because minors cannot consent to treatment themselves, the general rule is that 
physicians must obtain consent from the minors’ parents before rendering care.66  In fact, except 
in medical emergencies, physicians are liable of the tort of battery where they perform medical 
procedures on minors without first obtaining parental consent.67  The rationale for requiring 
parental consent is founded on two deeply rooted principles: (1) that minors need to be protected 
from the dangers of uninformed, immature decisions; and (2) who better to decide for children 
than parents who are presumed to act in their best interests.68
                                                 
61 Ann Eileen Driggs, Note, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH 
MATRIX 687, 704 (2001). 
62 Jennifer L. Rosato, The End of Adolescence: Let’s Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent 
Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 786 (2002) [hereinafter Rosato, End of 
Adolescence]. 
63 LYNN E. PONTON, THE ROMANCE OF RISK: WHY TEENAGERS DO THE THINGS THEY DO 1 (1997). 
64 ROSS, supra note 59, at 61.   
65 Scott, supra note 5, at 551.  For an in depth analysis of whether this account should apply to adolescent decision-
making, see infra Part IV. 
66 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 62, at 771.  Among the exceptions to this rule are emergency situations where 
consent is presumed to exist.  Driggs, supra note 61, at 691. 
67 Scott, supra note 5, at 566. 
68 Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 771-72. 
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II. WHY WE ALLOW PARENTS TO DECIDE AND WHEN WE DON’T 
 
 
 
Parents have a fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,69 to raise their children as they see fit.70  This right, grounded in both law and 
ethics, extends to inculcating religious values71 and making medical decisions72 for their 
incompetent children.  In Parham v. J.R. the United States Supreme Court stated that the “law’s 
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, 
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.  More 
important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in 
the best interests of their children.”73   
Buchanan and Brock offer four reasons in support of the position that parents are proper 
surrogate decision-makers for their children:74
1) “Because in most cases parents both care deeply about the welfare of their children 
and know them and their needs better than others do, they will be more concerned as well 
as better able than anyone else to ensure that the decisions made will serve their 
children’s welfare.” 
 
                                                 
69 The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
70 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). 
71 See Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 54 (1999) (stating that “controlling 
religious upbringing is considered one of the core aspects of parenting”). 
72 See, e.g., Rosato, Bioethics Discourse, supra note 25 (arguing that although parents should retain their primary 
decision-making status, the current state of the law should be reconsidered for situations where parents and children 
have conflicting interests).  
73 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).  Under the best interest principle the surrogate chooses “that which will maximally 
promote the patient’s good;” where this entails trying to “determine the net benefits to the patient of each option.” 
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 94.  Compare this to the substituted judgment principle whereby the 
surrogate chooses “as the patient would choose if the patient were competent and aware both of the medical options 
and of the facts about his or her condition, including the fact that he or she is incompetent.”  Id.. 
74 See also ROSS, supra note 59, at 39-41. 
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2) “[P]arents must bear the consequences of treatment choices for their dependent 
children and so should have at least some control of those choices.” 
 
3) Parents have a right, “at least, within limits, to raise their children according to the 
parents’ own standards and values and to seek to transmit those standards and values to 
their children.” 
 
4) “[T]he family is a valuable social institution, in particular [in] its role in fostering 
intimacy . . . The family must have some significant freedom from oversight, control, and 
intrusion to achieve intimacy. . .”75
 
In addition, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that the intimate family is itself autonomous, and as 
such, “promotes the interests and goals of both the children and parents.”76  She suggests that 
parents are in the best place to understand familial goals, and therefore, should retain final 
decision-making authority in continual pursuit of those goals.77    
This being said, parents generally enjoy the right to make decisions on behalf of their 
children without state interference.  The Supreme Court has stated that “it is cardinal with us that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”78  In fact, 
intervention is only justifiable where the state demonstrates “a powerful countervailing 
interest.”79   
The State of Massachusetts was successful in raising such an interest in the case of 
Prince v. Massachusetts.80  Prince involved the conviction of a nine-year-old girl’s custodial 
aunt for violation of the Massachusetts child labor laws.81  The aunt, a member of the Jehovah’s 
Witness Church, took her niece with her as she traveled throughout her neighborhood 
                                                 
75 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 233-34. 
76 ROSS, supra note 59, at 62. 
77 Id..  Ross’s beliefs are supported by work done by Ferdinand Schoeman who stated that “the family is to be 
thought of as an intimate arrangement with its own goals and purposes.”  BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 
236. 
78 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).  The 
right was recently reiterated by the Court in Troxel v. Granville.  530 U.S. at 57, 65-66 (2000). 
79 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
80 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
81 Id. at 159-60. 
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distributing religious materials.82  By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court 
it was uncontested that this activity violated state statute.  Rather, the Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the statute itself was constitutional as construed and applied in this context.83  
The aunt argued that it violated her First Amendment right to freedom of religion,84 and her 
parental rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.85
The Supreme Court presented the conflict as the “obviously earnest claim for freedom of 
conscience and religious practice,” coupled with the “parent's claim to authority in her own 
household and in the rearing of her children,” against the “interests of society to protect the 
welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end.”86  Although the Court 
acknowledged the strength of the former, it made clear that neither religious nor parental rights 
are beyond limitation.87
The Court concluded that the State, as parens patriae,88 has “wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”89  After describing the 
potential dangers of street propagandizing, the Court delivered one of its most oft quoted 
statements: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are 
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the 
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”90
                                                 
82 The two also stood in stationary locations holding up signs offering the material for five cents per copy.  Id. at 
161-62.   
83 Interestingly, both sides agreed that the statute was valid to the extent of secular application.  Id. at 165. 
84 The aunt relied on what is generally known as the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
85 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944). 
86 Id. at 165.    
87 Id. at 166. 
88 Literally meaning “parent of his or her country.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (7th ed. 1999). 
89 Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
90 Id. at 170. 
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A seemingly contrary result91 was reached in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, where three 
sets of Amish parents were convicted at trial of violating the State’s compulsory education law.92  
The statute in question required children to attend private or public school until the age of 
sixteen,93 but the parents acting in accordance with their religious beliefs,94 withdrew their 
children after they completed eighth grade.95   The parents did not challenge the fact that their 
actions violated the statute; rather, they argued that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon 
their First Amendment rights.96
The trial and appellate courts agreed that the compulsory education law interfered with 
the freedom of the parents to act in accordance with their religious beliefs, but concluded that the 
State’s interest in education made enactment of the statute a “reasonable and constitutional” 
exercise of government power.97  Wisconsin’s Supreme Court, on the other hand, asserted that 
this interest was not sufficient to override the parents’ rights.98  It therefore reversed the 
convictions holding that the compulsory education law violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.99  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Court began by noting that although the State’s interest in universal education is 
strong,100 it is not “totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights 
and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
                                                 
91 The reasoning in the both cases was consistent, but the results varied due in large part to the different evidentiary 
records presented. 
92 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
93 WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (1969). 
94 The parents feared that by sending their children to high school they “would not only expose themselves to the 
danger of the censure of the church community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation 
and that of their children.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209. 
95 Id. at 207.  
96 The parents presented expert evidence regarding the impact compulsory education could have on the “continued 
survival of Amish community” considering their “fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church 
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence.”  Id. at 210. 
97 Id. at 213. 
98 Id..  
99 Id..    
100 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
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Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of 
their children.”101  The Court found that the Amish way of life was protected under the First 
Amendment because their tradition is “one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized 
group, and intimately related to daily living.”102    
In this case the Court determined that forcing Amish children to attend high school would 
expose them to “worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs” in 
contravention of “the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith.”103  It determined 
that to do so, especially during the crucial developmental stage of adolescence, would interfere 
with “the religious development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the 
Amish faith community.”104  In finding the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional, the Court 
concluded that “enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the 
eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious 
beliefs.”105
The majority’s analysis in Yoder was framed as a conflict between the Amish parents and 
the State.106  The Court specifically noted that it was the parents who were charged under the 
Wisconsin statute, and therefore it was “their right of free exercise, not that of their children,” at 
stake.107  The State did not argue that the parents were preventing their children from attending 
                                                 
101 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1971).  
102 Id. at 216. 
103 Id. at 218. 
104 Id..  
105 Id. at 219.  The State attempted to argue that while Amish beliefs are unquestionably protected under the First 
Amendment, religious action or conduct is frequently regulated under the State’s police power.  Id. at 220.  The 
Court noted, however, that although the parents were charged for the action of removing their children from school, 
the Amish way of life is inseparable from their beliefs, and thus, still under the purview of the First Amendment.  Id. 
at 215-17, 220.  Because of the First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court utilized strict scrutiny to conclude 
that Wisconsin had not presented a sufficiently compelling state interest.   
106 Buss, supra note 71, at 56. 
107 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-31. 
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high school against the expressed wishes of the children, so the Supreme Court did not address 
situations involving conflicts between parents and their children.108
Although the Court was careful to limit its decision in the education setting to the specific 
facts before it,109 the Yoder decision is important because it signifies the strength of parents’ First 
Amendment right to foster the religious development of their children.   The majority opinion 
rejected the State’s reliance on Prince stating that there was no demonstration of “any harm to 
the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order or welfare.”110   
In the years between Prince and Yoder, state courts were substantially on their own in 
determining when to intervene when parents made medical decisions on behalf of their children 
based upon religious beliefs.111  Prior to Prince courts utilized a “life threatening exception,” that 
typically involved state intervention in situations where medical care would “obviate almost 
certain death for a minor whose parents refused to consent to a blood transfusion.”112  In cases 
where the child’s life was not in imminent risk, however, courts were hesitant to override 
parental objections to medical care.113  Thus, debate surrounded the issue of when children are 
placed in risk sufficient to rise to the level of Prince-like martyrdom.114   
                                                 
108 Id. at 231.  In a partial dissent, however, Justice Douglas indicated that the children’s rights and interests were at 
stake, and should have been given more consideration.  Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).  For a detailed 
discussion of the Douglas dissent see infra Part III. 
109 See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and 
Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 320 n.46 (1994). 
110 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230. 
111 Wadlington, supra note 109, at 317 (referring to a case in 1968, where in a one sentence opinion citing to Prince, 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Washington State statute authorizing courts to order blood 
transfusions for minor children over the objection of their parents.  Jehovah’s Witness v. King County Hosp. Unit 
No. 1, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)). 
112 Wadlington, supra note 109, at 315.   
113 Id. at 316-18 (detailing two cases at the outer limits of the “life threatening exception.”  In one case the court 
declined to order a recommended arm amputation of a young girl over the objection of the mother.  The mother did 
not have a religious objection, but feared the surgery was too risky.  In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942).  The 
other case involved a father who refused to consent to a surgery that would have corrected his son’s cleft palate and 
harelip.  The court honored the father’s objection, which was based on his own philosophical belief in mental 
healing, as opposed to organized religious beliefs.  In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955)). 
114 Wadlington, supra note 109, at 313-14. 
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In the early 1970s, two cases emerged addressing the varying judicial attitudes about the 
state’s role in protecting children “in situations that might fit within a category soon to be labeled 
‘medical neglect.’”115  The first, In re Sampson, involved neglect proceedings brought against the 
mother of a fifteen-year-old boy (Kevin) who suffered from neurofibromatosis.116  The mother 
consented to risky surgery aimed at correcting her son’s facial deformity, but refused to consent 
to the administration of any blood transfusions.117  As members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, 
they believed that blood transfusions would violate the biblical prohibition against the 
consumption of blood.118
Although the court noted that Kevin’s condition posed no immediate threat to his life, nor 
had it seriously affected his general physical health,119 it felt that corrective surgery offered him a 
chance for a “normal, happy existence,” that would “unquestionably be impossible if the 
disfigurement [was] not corrected.”120  In ordering the mother to permit Kevin to undergo the 
surgery, the court concluded that she was neglectful by virtue of her refusal to give consent for 
the “the surgical procedures necessary to insure the physical, mental and emotional well-being of 
                                                 
115 Id. at 319. 
116 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970).  The disease, also known as von Recklinghausen's, caused the boy 
to have “a large fold or flap of an overgrowth of facial tissue which causes the whole cheek, the corner of his mouth 
and right ear to drop down giving him an appearance which can only be described as grotesque and repulsive.”  Id..  
117 Id..  The physician planning to perform the procedure testified as to its high degree of risk even if the blood 
transfusions were authorized.  The surgical team refused to operate in the absence of transfusions.  Id. at 645. 
118  Jehovah’s Witnesses point to several biblical passages in support of their belief.  See RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS & 
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A QUICK REFERENCE TO FIFTEEN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION IN 
HEALTH CARE Jehovah’s Witness 1 (Edwin R. Dubose et al. eds. 2001)[hereinafter RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS].  For 
instance, when the flood subsided Noah was told “[e]very living thing that moves will be yours to eat, no less than 
the foliage of the plants.  I give you everything, with this exception: you must not eat flesh with life, that is to say 
blood, in it.”  Genesis 9:3-4.  Similarly, under the Levitican Laws of Holiness, the Israelites were warned, “If any 
member of the House of Israel . . . consumes blood of any kind, I shall set my face against that individual who 
consumes blood and shall outlaw him from his people.  For the life of the creature is in the blood . . . for blood is 
what expiates for a life.”  Leviticus 17:10-11.  The Deuteronomic Code further advises, “[t]ake care, however, not to 
eat the blood, since blood is life, and you must not eat the life with the meat.”  Deuteronomy 12:23.  Finally, in the 
New Testament, a passage states that one of the few burdens placed on the early Christians was to “abstain from 
food sacrificed to idols, from blood . . .” Acts 15:29.  
119 Id. at 652. 
120 Id. at 657. 
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her son.”121  The record did not reveal whether Kevin’s wishes were ascertained, implying the 
that State’s conclusion about what would serve Kevin’s best interests was controlling. 
 In the second case, In re Green, neglect proceedings were brought against the custodial 
mother of a fifteen-year-old boy (Ricky) who suffered from paralytic scoliosis.122  Ricky’s 
mother consented to risky surgery aimed at correcting his spinal curvature, but as a Jehovah’s 
Witness, she refused to allow blood transfusions to be administered during the procedure.123     
 According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the question before it was whether “the 
State [has] an interest of sufficient magnitude to warrant the abridgment of a parent's right to 
freely practice his or her religion when those beliefs preclude medical treatment of a son or 
daughter whose life is not in immediate danger?”124  The court acknowledged that Ricky’s 
condition was “unfortunate,” but held that the State does not have a sufficient interest to interfere 
with a parent’s religious beliefs unless the child’s life is “immediately imperiled by his physical 
condition.”125  
 The court then took an unusual step.  Taking a clue from the Douglas dissent in Yoder – 
stating that the rights and interests of children warrant more consideration – it remanded the case 
for an evidentiary hearing on Ricky’s wishes.126  The court stated that the record did not even 
note whether Ricky was a Jehovah’s Witness or planned to become one.127  On remand, Ricky 
                                                 
121 Id. at 658-59.  In affirming the decision, the New York Court of Appeals noted that its previous holding in 
Seiforth was not intended to limit the power of courts to direct surgery to solely those circumstances involving “risk 
to the physical health or life of the subject or to the public.”  In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (per 
curiam). 
122 292 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1972).  Ricky’s condition involved a 94% curvature of his spine that would ultimately 
render him bedridden.  Id.. 
123 Id..  
124 Id. at 390. 
125 Id. at 392.  The court expressly disagreed with the holding in Sampson that religious objections to blood 
transfusions are not a bar where the transfusions are necessary for the success of the required surgery.  Specifically, 
the Pennsylvania court was hesitant to call any surgery “required” where the life of the patient is not at stake.  Id. at 
391-92.    
126 Id. at 392. 
127 Id..  
 22
indicated that he did not wish to submit to the surgery, at least in part, because he had been in 
and out of the hospital and “no one had told him that ‘it is going to come out right.’”128  Because 
Ricky and his mother ended up agreeing that he not undergo surgery, the court never addressed 
how it would handle a situation where the child disagreed with his or her parents.   
 Although the courts in Sampson and Green had similar facts before them, they came to 
very different results.  While Green furthered the “life-threatening exception” to parental control, 
Sampson at least implicitly suggested that the child’s quality of life is a relevant consideration, 
and can give rise to state intervention as an additional exception. 
 The aforementioned cases indicate the complexity of trying to determine when parents 
are permitted to make medical decisions for their children, especially when those decisions 
involve religious beliefs.129  In general, parents enjoy the right to raise their children as they see 
fit without undue interference by the state.  This includes both fostering religious development 
and making medical decisions, but does not extend to decisions that put their children’s lives at 
risk.   
For the most part, these cases address conflicts between the rights and preferences of the 
parents and those of the state, without consideration of the preferences of the children.  Where 
parents are found to make decisions that do not appear to further the well-being of their children 
by placing their lives at risk, the state intervenes.  Further, the cases rest on the assumption that 
the minors in question are in need of and require protection either from their parents or the state 
when their rights are at stake.  Returning to the ethical discussion from Part I, the presumption is 
that either the parent or the state is in a better position than the child to promote the child’s well-
                                                 
128 Wadlington, supra note 109, at 321 n. 52 (citing In re Green, 307 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1973)).  
129 When religious beliefs are involved the parents argue under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, thus 
bolstering their claims against state intervention. 
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being.  While this may be true for younger minors, recent scholarship has challenged the notion 
that older minors, namely adolescents, should be treated identically.   
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III. RIGHTS OF MINORS: STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS, ABORTION & THE MATURE 
MINOR DOCTRINE 
 
 
 
Minors do have rights protected by the Constitution.  For instance, the Supreme Court has noted 
that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”130  Further, 
although recognizing the importance of the age of majority, the Court has stated that 
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only as one attains the 
state-defined age of majority.  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights.”131  It is clear, however, that these rights are much more limited 
than those of adults.132  What is less clear is the extent to which minors’ rights, when recognized, 
are distinguishable from those of their parents.133  The following discusses those situations where 
minors are afforded rights independent of their parents. 
                                                 
130 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
131 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
132 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-35 (1979) (stating that “the constitutional rights of children cannot be 
equated with those of adults,” because of “the particular vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing”).  See also Scott, 
supra note 6, at 552-53 (discussing the ability of states to restrict children’s access to obscene material, censorship 
in school newspapers, curfew ordinances, and other limitations that would be unconstitutional as applied to adults). 
133 See Buss, supra note 71, at 59; Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of Religion: The Conflict Between a Parent’s 
Rights and a Minor Child’s Right in Determining the Religion of the Child, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 219, 219-
20 (1995).  See also Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, 
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette, eds. 1980) (describing four 
distinguishable rights of children and adults (1) rights children and adults have in common – right to life; (2) rights 
possessed only by children – such as the right to have food and shelter provided for them; (3) rights only extended to 
adults – like making most legally binding decicions; and (4) rights in trust, or rights saved for the child until 
adulthood).   
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A. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS 
Statutory exceptions to the general rule that minors cannot make decisions for themselves 
commonly fall into one of two categories: (1) status exceptions; and (2) treatment exceptions.134  
Status exceptions serve to emancipate minors for the purpose of medical decision-making.  In 
other words, legal autonomy is extended to certain older minors “based on their individual or 
social circumstances.”135  Rhonda Gay Hartman indicates that these circumstances typically 
include “a minor who is homeless, married or divorced, has borne a child, is pregnant or has 
been pregnant, has graduated from high school, is living separately and independently, or is a 
member of the armed forces.”136   
 In some states emancipated minors are extended decision-making capacity beyond the 
health care setting.137  In this sense emancipation is designed “to be a way to legitimize a minor’s 
independence and ability to make decisions before they [reach] age eighteen.”138  Emancipation 
statutes provide formal procedures as well as the criteria necessary for a finding of 
emancipation,139 but some argue that determinations of emancipation primarily consider 
“financial independence as a measure of the maturity that an adult possesses to make major life 
decisions.”140  
                                                 
134 A few states have also adopted mature minor statutes.  See infra Part III.C. 
135 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Decision-Making, 28 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 409, 421 (2002) [hereinafter Hartman, Coming of Age].   
136 Id. at 421-22 (detailing various state emancipation statutes). 
137 Id. at 422. 
138 Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J. L. 
239, 259-60 (1992). 
139 Wadlington, supra note 109, at 323. 
140 See Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 777. 
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 Importantly, status exceptions have little to do with the actual decision-making capacity 
of the emancipated minors.141  For instance, one could argue that adolescents who get married or 
become pregnant show a level of immaturity in decision making. 
Jennifer Rosato suggests that “these exceptions appear to exist because of an ease of application 
and a need for consistency, rather than a recognition of the minor’s autonomy.”142   
 The second type of statutory exception allows minors to consent to specific types of 
treatment.143  Most states permit minors to consent to treatment for venereal diseases – as well as 
access to contraception, drug or alcohol dependency, mental health problems144 or sexual 
abuse145 without involving their parents. 
  Like the emancipation statutes, there is no indication that the treatment exceptions are 
founded on consideration of the minors’ actual decision-making capabilities.  Elizabeth Scott 
contends that “[n]o one argues that minors should be deemed adults because they are particularly 
mature in making decisions in these treatment contexts.  Rather, the focus is on the harm of 
requiring parental consent.”146  For example, a young girl may be afraid to tell her mother that 
she is being sexually abused by her father, and therefore will go untreated.  In this sense, the 
treatment exceptions seem to be an extension of the state’s parens partriae authority; however, 
rather than the state stepping in, it gives decision-making authority directly to minors. 
 Another policy behind the treatment exceptions stems from public health and safety.  
Adolescents may be hesitant to inform their parents of their sexual activity or substance abuse 
problems, and therefore will forego medical treatment.  Allowing minors to consent to these 
                                                 
141 Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 135, at 422. 
142 Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 777. 
143 Id. at 778.  
144 See Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 135, at 416-20. 
145 Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 778. 
146 Scott, supra note 5, at 568. 
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treatments without involving their parents removes a substantial obstacle.  As Scott points out, 
“society also has an interest in reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, substance 
abuse, mental illness, and teenage pregnancy.  Together, these social benefits largely explain 
why lawmakers shift the boundary of childhood for the purpose of encouraging treatment of 
these conditions.”147  
 
 
B. ABORTION 
 
In the years following Roe v. Wade,148 the Supreme Court was asked to address the extent to 
which states may regulate adolescent access to abortion.149  Discussions about adolescent 
abortion entail a balancing of interests: the adolescent’s right to choose to have an abortion 
versus the parental right to make important decisions on behalf of their children.150  
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, where 
one of the provisions of a Missouri abortion statute required minors to obtain consent from at 
least one parent before obtaining an abortion.151  In striking down the provision, the Court 
determined that the State’s interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental authority is not 
“sufficient justification” to condition a minor’s abortion on the consent of a parent or person in 
loco parentis.152  The Court stated that “[a]ny independent interest that parents may have in the 
termination of their minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of 
the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”153  
                                                 
147 Id..  See also Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-
Saving Medical Treatment – Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1177-78  
(1996). 
148 410 U.S. 113 (1979). 
149 Rosato, Bioethics Discourse, supra note 25, at 16-19; Scott, supra note 5, at 569-76.  
150 Whomever is more likely to act in the furtherance of the child’s well-being should trump. 
151 428 U.S. at 58. 
152 Id. at 75. 
153 Id..  
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Three years later the Court heard arguments in the case of Bellotti v. Baird, involving a 
Massachusetts abortion statute that required minors to obtain parental consent for an abortion, or 
if the parents refused, judicial approval.154  The Court began by noting that “legal restrictions on 
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances 
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and 
rewarding.”155  It went on, however, to state that the “need to preserve the constitutional right 
and the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State 
to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this 
matter.”156
In light of the special nature of pregnancy and abortion decisions, the Court concluded 
that if states require parental consent as a condition for minors seeking abortions they must also 
“provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”157  To 
this end, the Court held that: 
A pregnant minor is entitled to such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature 
enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her 
physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make 
this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.158
 
The Court ultimately struck down the Massachusetts statute finding that the judicial 
authorization it provided did not meet constitutional standards.159
                                                 
154 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 625.  The case was initially brought only on behalf of minors “who have adequate capacity 
to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents,” but it later 
included the rights of all pregnant minors.  Id. at 626-27. 
155 Id. at 638-39. 
156 Id. at 642.  The Court was cognizant of the fact that most limitations on minors’ rights constitute delays, for 
example the right to drive or vote, whereas the nature of pregnancy precludes delay.  Id..  
157 Id. at 643. 
158 Id. at 644.  The Court further held that “every minor must have the opportunity – if she so desires – to go directly 
to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents,” but the court maintains the right to require parental 
consultation if it determines that it would be in the minor’s best interests.  Id. at 647. 
159 Id. at 645. 
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 During the next two decades the Supreme Court heard a number of cases involving 
legislation aimed at regulating adolescent abortion.  Specifically, the cases dealt with the level of 
involvement parents should have in their adolescent daughter’s decision to have an abortion.160  
Starting with Bellotti, however, the Court made clear that adolescent girl’s must be given an 
opportunity, through judicial bypass, to establish that they are “mature and well enough informed 
to make intelligently the abortion decision on [their] own.”161  Though the Court did not provide 
an excessive amount of guidance in maturity determinations,162 the principle was set: pregnant 
adolescents adjudged to have sufficient maturity must have their decision to have an abortion 
respected. 
 The Supreme Court has not extended this opportunity to minors outside the abortion 
context.163  Whether minors should be afforded such rights in other situations is the subject of 
debate involving the Mature Minor Doctrine.   
 
                                                 
160 See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute requiring 
parental notification, but allowing the minor to bypass a parental refusal through judicial procedure); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (upholding a statute requiring parental consent, with a provision for 
judicial bypass); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1990) (upholding a statute requiring 
parental consent or notification, with a judicial bypass procedure); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) 
(upholding a statute requiring notice to both parents, with judicial bypass); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440-41 (1983) (the Court struck down a city ordinance requiring parental consent 
without providing an adequate bypass procedure); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-94 (1983) 
(upholding statute requiring consent from at least one parent, with judicial bypass); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 
409 (1981) (upholding a parental notice requirement as applied to an immature, dependent minor). 
161 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).  
162 See Scott, supra note 5, at 574 (calling Justice Powell’s prescription for judicial bypass “vague,” which has led to 
an “indeterminate legal standard”).  Scott indicates that in certain jurisdictions judges seem to rubber-stamp petitions 
of pregnant teens, while courts in others have a standard of maturity that few minors are able to meet.  Id.. 
163 Some commentators argue that the extension of these rights to minors in the abortion context is more about 
compromise than truly respecting adolescent decision-making ability.  See, e.g., id. at 575.  
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C. THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE: RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF AUTONOMOUS 
ADOLESCENTS? 
 
The theory behind the mature minor doctrine164 is simple: if a minor has sufficient competence to 
make an autonomous decision, that decision should be respected as such.165  In other words, 
certain minors are mature enough to know what decisions would be in accord with their 
conception of well-being, thus obviating protection from either their parents or the State.  A few 
states have enacted statutes giving minors found to have requisite competence166 the authority to 
consent to medical treatment,167 while others give children with sufficient age and competence a 
stronger voice in custodial disputes.168  For the most part, however, the mature minor doctrine 
exists as a creature of common law, the seeds of which were planted in the early 1970s.169   
 Perhaps the first manifestation by the Supreme Court of the importance of inquiring into 
the wishes of adolescents came in Justice Douglas’s partial dissent in Yoder.170  Recall that the 
majority in Yoder considered the issue to involve a conflict between the Amish parents and the 
                                                 
164 But see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 
1265, 1311 (2000) [hereinafter Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy] (noting that the use of “doctrine” implies a 
“consensus of judicial decisions,” which in this case would be a misnomer because only certain jurisdictions have 
empowered minors under specific circumstances). 
165 See id. Professor Hartman argues that “autonomous decisional ability should be the cornerstone for a coherent 
legal model governing issues of adolescence”).  Id. at 1270-71. 
166 Other states have created a bright-line rule allowing adolescents to consent to treatment without a competency 
determination.  S.C. CODE ANN. 20-7-280 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (permitting minors sixteen and older to consent to 
medical treatment); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40:1095 (West 2000) (allowing any minor to consent to medical 
treatment).  The Louisiana statute specifically excludes the ability to refuse medical treatment.  See Hartman, 
Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 164, at 1311 (citing OP. LA. ATT’Y GEN. NO. 88-232 (1988)). 
167 See Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 779 n.72 (citing to ARK. CODE ANN. 20-9-602(7) (Michie 
2000) (allowing unemancipated minors to consent to medical treatment if they are of sufficient intelligence to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of their decision); IDAHO CODE 39-4302 (Michie 2000) (stating that any 
person of competent intelligence to comprehend the nature and the significant risks posed by the medical treatment 
is competent to consent on his own behalf); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 129.030(2) (Michie 2001) (permitting a minor 
that understands the purpose of the examination and treatment and its probably outcome to consent to the medical 
treatment, but provider must make efforts to seek minor’s consent to communicate with parents in most instances); 
cf. ALASKA STAT. 25.20.025(2) (Michie 2000) (allowing a minor to consent to medical treatment without parental 
consent where the minor is first  counseled before such treatment)). 
168 See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 164, at 1287-90.  On a related note, juvenile criminal offenders 
found to have sufficient capacity are often tried and convicted as adults.  Id. at 1293-96. 
169 See Wadlington, supra 109, at 321-22, n.53 (arguing that, at least initially, the “mature minor doctrine was based 
less on concern about children’s rights than on the desire to negate a battery action against medical personnel if an 
older minor consented in near-emergency situations or when a parent was unavailable”).   
170 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-49 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting in part). 
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State.171  Justice Douglas disagreed with this characterization stating that “[w]here the child is 
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s 
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.”172  Importantly, Douglas went 
on to suggest that if a child disagrees with his or her parents’ decision “and is mature enough to 
have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents’ religiously 
motivated objections.”173
 Though his language was ethically charged, noticeably missing is a standard for 
determining maturity, or what makes a child’s particular desire deserving of respect.174  For 
example, it would be difficult to defend an argument that children are mature simply by virtue of 
expressing a desire conflicting with their parents.  That being said, Douglas at least presented the 
notion that when children’s rights are potentially abridged, their voices should be heard.175  In 
the years following Yoder, courts176 as well as scholars, began to point to the Douglas dissent 
when “calling for the recognition of children’s rights independent of the rights of their 
parents.”177    
 Ethically speaking it is not enough to say that children deserve to make decisions on their 
own; rather, there must be some evidence that they have sufficient competence to make 
autonomous decisions deserving of respect.  The presumption that minors lack this ability has 
                                                 
171 See supra Part II. 
172 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242. 
173 Id..   
174 In a footnote Justice Douglas pointed to the work of child psychologists and sociologists for the proposition that 
children aged fourteen and older have moral and intellectual maturity approaching that of an adult.  Id. at 245 n.3.  
175 For a discussion about the difficulty in ascertaining a child’s wishes and beliefs in the religious context, see infra 
Part V. 
176 See the discussion of In re Green supra Part II (finding that although the State could not interfere with the 
parent’s religious decision to refuse consent for a medical procedure, the case should be remanded for a 
determination of the child’s wishes). 
177 Buss, supra note 71, at 53, n.4.  For the purpose of this article two rights are of particular importance: the right of 
children to make medical decisions on their own, and the right to practice religion independent of their parents’ right 
to free exercise of religion. 
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already been discussed;178 whether that presumption applies with equal force to adolescents is 
another question.179
 Those who argue in favor of increased adolescent decisional rights point out that “the 
existing law fails to take into account a developmental perspective that ‘examines the soundness 
of age-based legal policies in light of scientific research and theory on psychological 
development.’”180  Beginning in the late 1970s – notably very soon after the Supreme Court first 
extended decision-making authority to pregnant teens in the abortion context – several 
psychological studies were conducted questioning the decision-making capabilities of minors in 
the medical setting.181   
Taken together these studies suggest that older adolescents are no less competent to 
provide consent than adults.182  Lois Weithorn and  Susan Campbell specifically compared the 
decision-making capabilities of variously aged minors and young adults.  They found that minors 
aged fourteen and older “demonstrate a level of competency equivalent to that of adults.”183  
These results supported earlier work performed by Jean Piaget which suggested that individuals 
enter the “formal operational stage” during adolescence, and thereafter “possess the cognitive 
                                                 
178 See supra Part II. 
179 Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 135, at 411. 
180 Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 783 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A 
Developmental Perspective on Serious Juvenile Crime: When Should Juveniles be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. 
PROBATION 52, 52 (1999)). 
181 See, e.g., Grisso & Vierling, supra note 57; Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Cambell, The Competency of Children 
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); David G. Scherer & N. 
Dickon Reppucci, Adolescents’ Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed Consent, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 123 
(1988); David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1991).  
182 See Hartman, Physician Perspectives, supra note 20, at 96-98 (discussing relevant studies in adolescent decision-
making capacity).  
183 Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 181, at 1595.  These findings supported earlier studies performed by Jean 
Piaget. 
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capability to reason, understand, appreciate, and articulate decisions comparable to young 
adults.”184
Although these studies cast doubt on the appropriateness of applying a presumption of 
incompetence to all adolescents, there are critics.  Some have argued that the findings are limited 
because the subjects were typically white and middle-class.185  Others suggest that these studies 
define competence too narrowly, or fail to consider psychosocial factors that impact adolescents 
differently than adults.186  In one of the first studies, Thomas Grisso and Linda Vierling 
articulated that “it would be inaccurate to conclude that all adolescents are intellectually capable 
of providing independent consent.”187  At the very least, these critiques indicate that it would be 
imprudent to reverse the current practice and adopt a presumption of competence for all 
adolescents.   
The cases that have dealt with the issue of whether to adopt a mature minor exception 
have called for or applied an individualized assessment of the maturity of the adolescents in 
question.188  When reading these cases it is important to remain cognizant of the conflict 
involved, and whether the minor is truly empowered to decide in accordance with his or her own 
conception of well-being. 
 
 
                                                 
184 Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 164, at 1286 (citing to early studies performed by Jean Piaget). 
185 Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 785, n. 110. 
186 Id. at 786. 
187 Grisso & Vierling, supra note 57, at 421.  The authors also suggest that the same might be true for a random 
sampling of adult subjects; however, because adults are presumed competent, they are not subject to the same 
scrutiny. 
188 The cases discussed below generally fall into three categories: (1) those that adopt a mature minor doctrine and 
apply it to the adolescent in question; (2) those that adopt the doctrine and hold that the minor’s maturity should 
have been determined; and (3) those that refuse to adopt the mature minor doctrine or hold that it does not apply to 
the given circumstances.   
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1. Cardwell v. Bechtol189
In perhaps the seminal case addressing the mature minor doctrine,190 the Tennessee Supreme 
Court considered whether the State should adopt the doctrine as an exception to the rule that 
physicians must obtain parental consent before treating minors.191  Without her parents’ 
knowledge, Sandra Cardwell (aged seventeen years, seven months) visited an osteopathic 
physician who had treated her father in the past.192  The physician incorrectly concluded that 
Sandra’s back pain was not caused by a herniated disc, and proceeded to treat her through 
manipulations of the neck, spine and legs.193   
 When Sandra’s pain did not subside, and she developed bladder and bowel retention 
coupled with decreased sensation in her legs and buttocks, she underwent diagnostic testing 
confirming that she did in fact have a herniated disc.  She eventually had surgery performed in an 
attempt to correct the problem, but almost one year later she still had not regained full bowel 
control or lower body sensation.194  Sandra and her parents filed suit against the osteopathic 
physician for malpractice (the misdiagnosis), battery (failure to obtain parental consent),195 
negligent failure to obtain consent, and failure to obtain informed consent.196  This implies that 
the parents disagreed with Sandra’s decision to see the osteopath in the first place. 
 The trial court granted the physician’s Motion for Directed Verdict on the malpractice 
claim because the Cardwells failed to meet their burden of proof.  The court also instructed the 
                                                 
189 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987). 
190 Although earlier cases recognized an exception to obtaining parental consent in litigation involving claims of 
battery, Cardwell is one of the most oft-sited cases regarding the mature minor doctrine.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Pa. 2000); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836 (W.Va. 
1992); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989).  
191 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 741. 
192 Id. at 743. 
193 Id. at 741-42. 
194 Id. at 742. 
195 See supra Part I. 
196 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 742. 
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jury that if it found Sandra to be mature, the physician was not liable for battery or failure to 
obtain informed consent.197  The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the physician, but the 
appellate court reversed holding that neither the Tennessee Legislature nor the State’s Supreme 
Court had adopted the mature minor exception to the parental consent requirement.198   
 The Tennessee Supreme Court permitted an appeal, and used it as an opportunity to 
formally adopt the mature minor doctrine.  In so doing the court noted the State’s medical 
treatment exception statutes,199 and its treatment of older adolescents in the criminal context.200  
The court was not willing to grant physicians a “general license” to treat any minor without 
parental consent; rather it held that application of the mature minor doctrine is “dependent on the 
facts of each case.”201  Specifically, the court stated: 
Whether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment depends upon the age, 
ability, experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by 
the minor, as well as upon the conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the 
incident involved.  Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the treatment 
and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor’s ability to appreciate the risks and 
consequences are to be considered.202  
 
The court concluded that this determination is a question of fact properly left in the hands of the 
jury.  In Sandra’s case, the court felt that the jury was justified in concluding that she “had the 
ability, maturity, experience, education and judgment . . . to consent knowingly to medical 
treatment.”203  Sandra was thus empowered as a mature minor to consent to treatment regardless 
of her parents disagreement.   
                                                 
197 Id.. 
198 Id.. 
199 See supra Part III. A.  The court concluded that the statutes are not exhaustive, nor do they “abrogate judicial 
adoption of an exception to the general common law rule.”  Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tenn. 1987).  
But see Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (holding that similar statutes indicate the extent of 
legislative intent to grant minors the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment). 
200 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 745. 
201 Id..  
202 Id. at 748.   
203 Id. at 749.  Interestingly, relying on the Rule of Sevens, the court reassigned presumptions regarding the capacity 
to make medical decisions: those under the age of seven still require parental consent; those aged seven to fourteen 
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2. Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center204
Another early case addressing the mature minor doctrine involved Larry Belcher who was aged 
seventeen years, eight months, and suffered from muscular dystrophy.205  After a fit of breathing 
difficulty Larry’s parents took him to the emergency room, where he subsequently suffered 
breathing failure, was intubated, placed on a respirator, and transferred to the pediatric intensive 
care unit.206
 Larry’s treating physician asked his parents whether they would want Larry reintubated 
should he suffer breathing failure again.  Although they initially were undecided, they ultimately 
told the physician that “they did not want Larry reintubated or resuscitated unless Larry 
requested it.”207  Without consulting Larry, the physician entered a Do Not Resuscitate order into 
Larry’s progress notes.208  When Larry later suffered another respiratory arrest, he went into 
cardiac failure and died.  His parents filed suit for wrongful death and medical malpractice, but 
lost at trial.209  They appealed the issue of whether Larry should have been consulted prior to 
entering the DNR order, which the West Virginia Supreme Court suggested would require 
recognition of the “so-called ‘mature minor’ exception to the common law rule of parental 
consent.”210
                                                                                                                                                             
are presumed incompetent, but can rebut that presumption; while those aged fourteen to eighteen, like adults, are 
presumed competent.  Id.. 
204 422 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 1992).  
205 Id. at 829. 
206 Id. at 830. Testimony during trial indicated that when Larry was later extubated he seemed “anxious and 
apprehensive,” and motioned his head “no” when asked by his treating physician whether he would want to be 
reintubated.  Id..  
207 Id..   
208 Id..  The physician claimed that he did not consult Larry because “(1) he was emotionally immature due to his 
disease; (2) he was on medication which diminished his capacity; (3) involving him in the decision would have 
increased his anxiety, thus reducing his chances of survival; and (4) Larry’s parents told [him] that they did not want 
Larry involved.”  Id.. 
209 Id..  
210 Id. at 831.  Interestingly, the court could have decided the case under a parents’ rights approach, because it was 
Larry’s parents’ wish that he be consulted that was violated. 
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 Citing to Cardwell,211 the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the mature minor 
doctrine under the common law of the State.212  The court held that  
application of the mature minor rule would vary from case to case.  The focus would be 
on the maturity level of the minor at issue, and whether that minor has the capacity to 
appreciate the nature and risks involved of the procedure to be performed, or the 
treatment to be administered or withheld.213   
 
Like Cardwell,214 the court in Belcher considered this determination to be a question of fact; “a 
matter for the jury to decide, and not for this Court to speculate.”215  On the other hand, the court 
concluded that “where there is a conflict between the intentions of one or both parents and the 
minor, the physician’s good faith assessment of the minor’s maturity level would immunize him 
or her from liability for the failure to obtain parental consent.”216  Rather than itself making a 
determination as to Larry’s maturity, the court remanded the case so that Larry’s maturity could 
be assessed in light of the court’s adoption of the mature minor doctrine.217  The court 
recognized at least the potential for conflict between parents and their children, and empowered 
mature minors to consent to or refuse medical treatment over their parents’ objection.218
 The West Virginia court did not draw a distinction between consenting to or refusing 
medical treatment.  In support of this one might argue that once minors are deemed mature they 
should be afforded rights equal to those of adults; and adults clearly may refuse medical 
treatment, even where death is the probable result.219  Many commentators, however, are not 
                                                 
211 The West Virginia court listed factors almost identical to those listed in Cardwell.  See supra note 202. 
212 Id. at 837.  By utilizing the State’s common law, the court obviated the need to discuss whether mature minors 
have federal constitutional rights to consent to or refuse medical treatment. 
213 Id. at 838.  Note that Cardwell addressed only the right to consent to treatment whereas the court in Belcher 
suggests the right to refuse treatment as well.   
214 The West Virginia court, however, was unwilling to rely on the Rule of Sevens.  Id. at 837 n.13. 
215 Id. at 837.  The court acknowledged that initially physicians would be given the difficult task of determining a 
minor’s maturity, thus necessitating good record keeping.  Id. at 837 n.14. 
216 Id. at 838. 
217 Id.. 
218 The court admitted, however, that the State’s legislature could prohibit recognition of the mature minor doctrine 
should it so desire.  Id.. 
219 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
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ready to go this far when it comes to minors refusing life-saving,220 or life-sustaining 221 medical 
treatment.222  Complicating this issue further, is the fact that parents are typically not permitted 
to make decisions that put their children’s lives at risk.223
3. In re Swan224
Seventeen-year-old Chad Swan was in an automobile accident that left him in a persistent 
vegetative state.  His body was maintained by life-sustaining treatment involving a gastrostomy 
tube providing hydration and nutrition.225  When the tube eventually eroded, the attending 
physicians recommended that it not be reinserted; Chad’s parents agreed.   
 When Swan was decided, the notion of a “right to die,” for any individual was relatively 
new.226  States typically challenged decisions to remove gastrostomy tubes and the like by 
raising four State interests: (1) interests in the preservation of human life; (2) prevention of 
suicide; (3) third party interests; and (4) protecting the integrity of the medical profession.227  
Taking a proactive stance, and fearing civil or criminal liability, the Swans sought declaratory 
relief from a trial court in Maine.228  The trial court listened to evidence presented by Chad’s 
                                                 
220 Life-saving medical treatment refers to life or death curative treatment that promises that the patient’s “short- and 
long-term prognoses are excellent.”  Harvey, supra note 21, at 316.  For example treatments that, if given, will 
restore the patient to a healthy state, but if withheld, will result in certain death – blood transfusions, or insulin 
treatment for diabetics. 
221 Life-sustaining treatment, on the other hand, generally involves a quality of life inquiry.  The patient is likely to 
succumb to the underlying disease, but with treatment, could expect to live longer than without.  Id..  Many cancer 
treatments fall into this category, because they may extend life for a few months or years, but often involve 
physically burdensome side-effects.   
222 Compare Driggs, supra note 61 (arguing that adolescents should never be permitted to refuse treatment when 
death is the probable outcome), and Penkower, supra note 147 (arguing that the mature minor doctrine should not be 
utilized to permit minors to refuse life-saving medical treatment), with Harvey, supra note 21 (arguing for a sliding 
scale of adolescent empowerment depending upon the type of treatment involved).  But see Melinda T. Derish & 
Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J. 
L. MED. & ETHICS 109 (2000). 
223 See supra Part II. 
224 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990). 
225 Id. at 1202. 
226 See generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (2d ed. 1995) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the history 
and development of the right to choose death rather than medical treatment).  
227 See, e.g., Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 135, at 441. 
228 In re Swan, 569 A.2d at 1203-04. 
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mother about his prior wishes, and concluded that Chad would not have consented to reinsertion 
of the tube.229
 The district attorney, on behalf of the State, challenged the court’s ruling raising interests 
(1), (3) and (4) above.  The attorney also argued that any right Chad might have to refuse 
medical treatment “was significantly reduced because [he] was under the legal age of majority 
when he expressed those wishes.”230  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine rejected these 
arguments finding that Chad’s status as a minor was merely a “factor to be considered by the fact 
finder in assessing the seriousness and deliberateness” of his statements.231  In making clear that 
its decision was based on Chad’s beliefs – as opposed to the court’s or parents’ view of what was 
best for him232 – the court concluded that Chad’s wishes to not be maintained in a persistent 
vegetative state reflected “well-informed desires as to medical treatment,” and should be 
followed.233
 Although the court decided the case based upon Chad’s previously expressed wishes, the 
manifested conflict was between the parents and the State.  For instance, if the parents had 
wanted Chad to be maintained by the gastrostomy tube, one has to wonder whether his 
previously expressed wishes to the contrary would have surfaced.  Therefore, it is not clear how 
empowering Swan would be for future cases involving adolescent refusal of life-saving or life-
sustaining medical treatment where the child’s wishes conflict with the parents’. 
                                                 
229 Id. at 1205.  Chad’s mother testified to remembering Chad state “‘If I can’t be myself . . . no way . . . let me go to 
sleep,’” when discussing a young boy his grandmother knew who was in a persistent vegetative state.  Similarly, 
after visiting a comatose friend in the hospital, Chad told his brother “‘I don’t ever want to get like that . . . I would 
want somebody to let me leave – to go in peace.’”  Id..     
230 Hartman, Coming of Age, supra note 135, at 440. 
231 In re Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205. 
232 See Rosato, End of Adolescence, supra note 62, at 781.  
233 Id. at 1205-06. 
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4. Benny Agrelo and Billy Best 
In the mid 1990s two adolescents gained wide publicity in their attempts to forego medical 
treatment.234  Benny was a fifteen-year-old Floridian who had undergone two liver transplants.  
He took immunosupressants that caused severely debilitating side effects to prevent his body 
from rejecting the organs.235  Benny ultimately decided to stop taking the medication against 
both his parents’ and doctors’ wishes.  At some point, however, his mother began to support his 
decision.236  When the hospital discovered this, they instituted neglect proceedings against his 
mother.237  Benny was taken to the hospital where he resisted resuming the 
immunosupressants.238   
 A juvenile court judge held separate meetings with Benny, his mother and his health care 
team.  The judge determined that Benny was mature enough to understand what he was doing, 
and prohibited further interference with his wishes.  Benny returned home and died from liver 
failure a few months later.239  Unfortunately, because juvenile court records are sealed, it is 
unclear what factors the judge considered in making the determination.240  Benny was 
empowered to make the decision to forego medical treatment, but like Chad, he had agreement 
from his mother. 
 Billy Best was a sixteen-year-old resident of Massachusetts suffering from Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma.  Two and a half months into a six month chemotherapy regimen, Billy refused 
further treatment.  Fearing that his parents would force him to undergo additional rounds of 
                                                 
234 See Harvey, supra note 21, at 307. 
235 Id. at 307. 
236 Drigg, supra note 61, at 687. 
237 See supra Part II (discussing conflicts between parents and the State). 
238 Driggs, supra note 61, at 688. 
239 Id.. 
240 Harvey, supra note 21, at 307. 
 41
chemo, Billy left home and ran to Texas.241  Although Billy’s physicians indicated that the 
treatment had a ninety percent cure rate, his parents promised not to force him to submit to 
further treatment.242  Massachusetts chose not to intervene, and Billy returned home.243  Rather 
than continue chemotherapy, Billy began a series of alternative therapies that succeeded in 
sending his illness into remission.244  While this was good for Billy, it obviously leaves open the 
question of whether the State would have intervened had Billy’s condition turned grave and his 
parents continued to uphold his wish to forego traditional medical treatment. 
The aforementioned cases suggest that in certain states, depending on the circumstances, 
the administration of life-saving or sustaining medical treatment to adolescents who do not want 
that treatment may be foregone where the minor is adjudged mature and the parents agree with 
the decision.  This stands in contrast to the general rule that state governments intervene in these 
situations under the assumption that parents who place their children’s lives at risk are acting 
contrary to the child’s well-being.  Further, the cases do not provide guidance as to the level of 
maturity a child would need to refuse treatment where death is the likely result. 
Notably, the religious beliefs of the parents were not a factor in any of the above cases; 
rather, the decisions were based upon medical information and quality of life determinations.  
Recall that religion played a major role in many of the earlier cases defining the scope of 
parental rights and the duty of the state to intervene as parens patriae.245  While parents were 
permitted to remove their children from formal schooling based upon their religious beliefs, they 
were not permitted to put their children’s lives at risk.  Without consulting the children in 
                                                 
241 Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical 
Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2075 (1996). 
242 Harvey, supra note 21, at 307. 
243 Id..     
244 Driggs, supra note 61, at 688. 
245 See supra Part II. 
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question, the conflict in each case was between the parents’ and state’s belief about what would 
be in the children’s best interests.   
When the child’s life is at stake, the state presumes that his or her well-being is better 
served by being kept alive than by dying according to the parents’ chosen religious beliefs.  The 
following cases involve parents and children attempting to avoid state intervention by arguing 
that the choice to die is based not upon the parents’ beliefs, but upon the children’s. 
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IV. THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS REFUSALS IN CASE LAW 
 
 
 
An analysis of the following cases is meant to shed light on the inconsistencies in the adoption 
and application of a state recognized mature minor doctrine, especially when religious beliefs are 
involved.  In practice, the mature minor doctrine should serve to empower adolescent’s capable 
of autonomous decision-making.  To that end, the focus in each case should be on whether the 
child’s decision appears to be in line with his or her true conception of well-being, regardless of 
the parents’ beliefs.246  Each fails in this regard.   
 
 
A. IN RE E.G.247
  
Ernestine Gregory was a seventeen and half-year-old female diagnosed in 1987 with acute 
nonlymphatic leukemia, a malignant disease of the white blood cells.248  She was admitted to the 
hospital where physicians told her that the recommended course of treatment involved 
chemotherapy coupled with blood transfusions.249  While both Ernestine and her mother agreed 
to all other forms of treatment, they adamantly opposed any blood transfusions based upon their 
religious beliefs.250   
 In response to this refusal, attending physicians at the hospital contacted the office of the 
State’s Attorney, which office subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking a 
                                                 
246 To date, no court has permitted a child to choose to refuse medical treatment without parental consent where 
death is the probable result.  As will be shown in Part V infra, in the religious context parental consent should not 
necessarily bolster the child’s decision to refuse treatment.  
247 549 N.E. 2d 322 (Ill. 1989); 515 N.E.2d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
248 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.   
249 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 287.  Ernestine’s treating physician testified that with treatment her survival rate was 
twenty to twenty-five percent, with a remission rate of eighty percent.  In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323. 
250 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
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finding that Ernestine was medically neglected by her mother.251  At the time of the initial 
hearing, Ernestine suffered greatly from depleted platelet counts and had blood that was only 
transporting oxygen at one-fifth to one-sixth normal capacity.252  A treating physician testified 
that Ernestine’s condition left her “excessively fatigued and incoherent,” and that without 
transfusion, she “would likely die within a month.”253  The physician also indicated, however, 
that in his belief “Ernestine was competent to understand the consequences of accepting or 
rejecting treatment,” and he was “impressed with her maturity and the sincerity of her beliefs.”254  
At this point the court found probable cause to believe that Ernestine was medically neglected, 
and “appointed the hospital official temporary custodian with power to consent to all medical 
treatment.”255
 Roughly six weeks later, the court called the case for reconsideration.  Ernestine had been 
continuously receiving blood transfusions, and was able to testify.256  Ernestine stated that “she 
had studied her faith for several years, and that she had been baptized at age 16, which made her 
an adult in the eyes of her church.”257  She further testified that “the decision to refuse blood 
transfusions was her own and that she fully understood the nature of her disease and the 
consequences of her decision.  She indicated that her decision was not based on any wish to die, 
but instead was grounded in her religious convictions.”258   
                                                 
251 Id..   
252 Id. at 296 (McNamara, J., dissenting). 
253 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. 1989). 
254 Id.. 
255 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 288. 
256 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.  
257 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 288. 
258 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.  Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that death is a deep sleep from which they will be 
awoken on the day of Armageddon.  See RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS, supra note 118, at 6. However, if they receive a 
blood transfusion they can sever their relationship with God, forfeit a chance of eternal life, and become 
excommunicated from the congregation.  Id. at 8.    
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 In addition to her own testimony, Ernestine presented several witnesses to substantiate 
her maturity and decision-making capability.  One such witness was a psychiatrist who testified 
that, in his opinion, “Ernestine had the maturity level of an 18 to 21 year old,” and that she had 
the “competency to make an informed decision to refuse the blood transfusions, even if the 
choice was fatal.”259   
 In the end, concluding that it was in her best interests, the trial court ruled that Ernestine 
was medically neglected, and appointed a guardian to consent to medical treatment.260  The court 
went on to state that Ernestine was “‘a mature 17-year-old individual,’ that reached her decision 
on an independent basis, and that she was ‘fully aware that death [was] assured absent 
treatment.’”261  However, the court also expressed  concern that “outward appearances and 
expressed beliefs often do not reflect the individual’s true wishes.” 262  Although heavily 
considering Ernestine’s and her mother’s wishes – and the religious basis for them – the court 
felt that the State’s interest in the case was greater.263  
 On appeal Ernestine and her mother argued that the trial court’s order violated 
Ernestine’s constitutional rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by 
infringing on her religious freedom.264  At the time this case was heard, Illinois case law clearly 
established that adults have the right to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons under the 
Constitution.265  Further, it was apparent that parents are not permitted to make decisions harmful 
                                                 
259 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.  Ironically, the doctor found Ernestine to be mature based upon her responses to 
questions regarding her future plans; a future that would be precluded by allowing her to refuse the blood 
transfusions.  In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 293 (McNamara, J. dissenting).  
260 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324. 
261 Id.. 
262 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 293 (McNamara, J. dissenting). 
263 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.  The court did not identify which particular State interests were greater. 
264 Id.. 
265 See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965). 
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to their children based upon religious beliefs,266 including refusing blood transfusions.267  What 
was unclear, however, was whether a minor has the constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment for themselves. 
For an answer to this question, the appellate court turned to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the abortion arena.268  The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court has 
yet to extend such rights beyond reproductive matters, but found that “such an extension is 
inevitable.”269  The court stated that “[g]iven the paramount importance of religious freedom in 
the history of our nation,” it is unlikely that less protection would be afforded to it than the rights 
at stake in abortion cases.270
The appellate court ultimately held that Ernestine was medically neglected; however, by 
virtue of that neglect, she became partially emancipated.271  As a partially emancipated mature 
minor,272 Ernestine had the right to refuse the blood transfusion regardless of her mother’s 
consent, such that the trial court’s order was “an unjustified abridgement of her first amendment 
rights.”273  The State’s petition to the Supreme Court of Illinois was granted. 
By the time of the argument in front of the Illinois Supreme Court Ernestine had turned 
eighteen.  The court decided to hear the case, although technically moot, because it presented “an 
                                                 
266 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 289 (citing the oft-quoted martyrdom language in Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 
158, 170 (1944)). 
267 See Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952). 
268 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 290.  See supra Part IV. 
269 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 290.  
270 Id.. 
271 The court relied on the Illinois Emancipation of Mature Minors Act that states that minors sixteen years of age or 
over found to be neglected may be partially or completely emancipated upon a showing of “capacity to manage his 
own affairs.”  Id..  
272 The appellate court based its determination of Ernestine’s maturity on the statements made by the trial court, not 
a separate inquiry.  Id. at 293 (McNamara, J. dissenting). 
273 Id. at 291. 
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issue of substantial public interest.”274  That issue being whether minors have a right to refuse 
medical treatment. 
The Illinois Supreme Court began by acknowledging that the common law age of 
majority, eighteen, is not “an impenetrable barrier that magically precludes a minor from 
possessing and exercising certain rights normally associated with adulthood.”275  It went on to 
detail statutory exceptions where minors are granted the right to seek medical attention including 
treatment.276  The court also noted that the Illinois Criminal Code provides a “sliding scale of 
maturity” that permits certain minors to be tried and convicted as adults.277  Finally, like the 
appellate court, it looked to the abortion arena where the United States Supreme Court has 
extended protection to minors under the Constitution.278   
With this backdrop the Illinois Supreme Court determined that if adjudged a mature 
minor by clear and convincing evidence, Ernestine had the right to control her own health 
care.279  The court felt that a trial judge must be employed to make this determination in light of 
the State interests involved; namely, in the sanctity of life and the State’s duty as parens patriae 
to protect minors.280  The court created a common law right to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment for minors “mature enough to appreciate the consequences of [their] actions,” and 
“mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult.”281   
The court concluded, however, that the minor’s right is not absolute, and must be 
weighed against four State interests: “(1) the preservation of life; (2) protecting the interests of 
third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
                                                 
274 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325. 
275 Id.. 
276 Id..  
277 Id. at 326. 
278 Id.. 
279 Id. at 327. 
280 Id.. 
281 Id. at 327-28. 
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profession.”282  Of these, the court felt that in Ernestine’s case, the interests of third parties was 
most significant.  The court stated that if Ernestine’s mother opposed her refusal of the blood 
transfusions the court would have given serious consideration to the mother’s wishes.283  
Because the court found that a mature minor “may exercise a common law right to consent to or 
refuse medical care,” it declined to address whether refusing medical treatment for religious 
reasons is protected under the First Amendment.284  By doing so, the court downplayed the 
relevance of religious beliefs as the basis for Ernestine’s refusal of the blood transfusions. 
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court held that if Ernestine were found to be a mature minor 
by clear and convincing evidence she would have had the right to control her medical care.  
Interestingly, because Ernestine was eighteen by the time of this ruling, the court found no point 
in remanding the case to the trial court for a proper determination of whether she was a mature 
minor at the time of the initial hearing.285   
This appears to be very empowering for future cases, but is limited for two reasons.  
First, Ernestine’s particular circumstance was not considered by the Illinois Supreme Court, so 
cases with similar facts cannot point to the supreme court’s ruling as dispositive of maturity.  
Second, even if the supreme court had held Ernestine to be mature, it stated that if her mother 
had not agreed with her decision, it would “weigh heavily against the minor’s right to refuse.”286  
Thus, even if mature, Ernestine’s decision would not have been respected as autonomous.  
Paradoxically this suggests that a mature minor is only empowered to refuse life-saving or 
sustaining medical treatment to the extent that his or her decision coincides with a parent’s belief 
                                                 
282 Id. at 328. 
283 Id.. 
284 Id.. 
285 Id..  The court also reversed the appellate court’s finding of medical neglect on the part of Ernestine’s mother, 
because had she been declared a mature minor, no neglect could have been found. Id.. 
286 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989). 
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that alone would be restricted by the State.287  Compare the analyses used by the Illinois courts to 
that utilized by a trial court in New York. 
 
B. IN THE MATTER OF LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER288
Philip Malcolm, just seven weeks shy of eighteen, was admitted to the hospital when he 
presented to the emergency room with dangerously low hemoglobin and hematocrit blood 
counts.  Both he and his parents refused any blood transfusions as members of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith.289  The next morning the hospital and physicians petitioned the court for an order 
authorizing what they called necessary treatment.  Philip and his parents were present at the 
hearing where they learned that Philip had cancer.  The physicians recommended a course of 
chemotherapy coupled with blood transfusions.290
 At the hearing Philip’s step-father testified that he was adamant in his refusal of blood 
transfusions, and believed Philip would die or be unable to live a normal life regardless of what 
was done.  Philip and his mother also stated that they would not consent to blood transfusions.  
Noting that the hearing was the first time the family learned of the cancer, the court adjourned 
until the following day for the family to reconsider its position.291   
 The following day the hospital presented testimony that without a blood transfusion 
Philip would likely die within the month, and hence there was need for immediate action.  
Through testimony of the family the court learned that they had joined the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
three years earlier.  Philip stated that he lost interest for a while, but began studying his faith 
                                                 
287 In the religious context this is problematic.  See infra Part V. 
288 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
289 Id. at 240. 
290 Id. at 241.  With treatment the cure rate was estimated to be twenty to twenty-five percent, and the likelihood of  
remission for months or years was seventy-five percent.  Id.. 
291 Id.. 
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again about a year prior.  He did not know the books of the Bible, but did seem to understand the 
“basic tenet of the religion’s prohibition regarding blood transfusions.”292  Philip also stated that 
he considered himself a child, rather than an adult, and that if the court ordered the transfusion, 
“it would not be his responsibility or his sin.”293  Finally, the court noted that Philip always 
consulted his parents before making a decision, and there was no evidence to suggest that his 
parents encouraged him to make his own decision in this case.294
 The court ultimately ordered immediate transfusions to stabilize Philip’s condition, but 
did not order chemotherapy or further transfusions.  Philip and his parents appealed the initial 
order raising this issue: “[d]oes an intelligent, articulate young man, just weeks shy of his 18th 
birthday, have due process right [sic] to demonstrate his capacity to make medical decisions for 
himself consistent with his values and convictions before he loses the right to control what is 
done to his body?”295   
The judge cited to In re E.G. and Belcher for the proposition that mature minors may 
refuse medical treatment,296 but concluded that “[w]hile this court believes there is merit to the 
‘mature minor’ doctrine, I find that Philip Malcolm is not a mature minor.”297  Interestingly, the 
court noted that it did not appear as though the decision was Philip’s own, such that it was 
consistent with his values and convictions.  This implies that the court was not convinced that 
Philip’s decision to refuse the blood transfusions was based upon religious beliefs in accordance 
                                                 
292 Philip believed that if he consented to a blood transfusion he would not have everlasting life.  Id. at 242.   
293 Id..  Certain Jehovah’s Witness congregations believe that if blood transfusions are given without the person’s 
consent, his or her conscience is clear.  See RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS, supra note 118, at 3. 
294 Id..  
295 Id. at 243. 
296 Unlike the courts in Belcher and In re E.G., however, this court made a distinction between the right to consent 
and the right to refuse medical treatment, but did not decide whether they should be equated.  Id.. 
297 Id.. 
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with his well-being.298  As a trial court, however, the New York Supreme Court was hesitant to 
adopt the mature minor doctrine; rather, it recommended that “the Legislature or the appellate 
courts take a hard look at the ‘mature minor’ doctrine and make it either statutory or decisional 
law in New York State.”299   
The lower courts in Illinois, and the New York trial court, paid some attention to the 
expressed religious beliefs of the adolescents in question.300  The appellate court in Illinois was 
satisfied that Ernestine was mature enough to refuse blood transfusions based upon her religious 
beliefs where death was the certain result.  The trial court in New York, on the other hand, was 
not convinced of Philip’s maturity to do the same.  Not all courts feel that maturity should even 
be a factor in determining whether minors should be permitted to refuse medical treatment. 
 
C. NOVAK V. COBB COUNTY KENNESTONE HOSPITAL AUTHORITY301
 
Greg Novak was in a serious car accident when he was sixteen-years-old.  In the ambulance on 
the way to the hospital he informed the paramedics that he was a Jehovah’s Witness, and as such, 
did not want any blood transfusions administered.302  At the hospital his father consented to a 
surgery that was performed without blood transfusions.303  The following day Greg’s treating 
physicians became concerned when blood tests revealed that his blood was deficient in levels of 
                                                 
298 It is only implicit, because there were limited facts before the court, and it did not specify its exact reasoning for 
finding Philip immature to make the decision. 
299 Id.. 
300 The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand, did not discuss how Ernestine’s religious beliefs would come into 
play in a maturity determination. 
301  846 F.Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994) aff’d, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996). 
302 Novak, 846 F.Supp. at 1563. 
303 Greg’s parents were divorced, and although his mother had custody, she was not available at first to give consent.  
She took over decision-making authority once she arrived.  Id..  
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both hemoglobin and hematocrit.  Greg and his mother remained adamant in their refusal of 
blood transfusions.304
 Later that day the physicians came to the conclusion that without a blood transfusion 
Greg’s life was in eminent danger.  They contacted the hospital’s legal team who petitioned for a 
court appointed guardian ad litem.305  A hearing was held, without Greg’s mother, and a guardian 
was appointed.306  On his second day in the hospital, Greg’s guardian petitioned the Superior 
Court of Cobb County to allow the hospital to perform the blood transfusions.  The judge granted 
the petition, and Greg was “physically restrained and transfused with three units of packed red 
blood cells.”307  Roughly six weeks later, Greg was released from the hospital; and after a 
lengthy recovery period, “resumed normal physical activity for person of his age but [suffered] 
from a slight limp” resulting from his accident-related injuries.308
 Greg and his mother filed suit raising a number of claims under federal and state law.  
Initially, both alleged violations of their First and Fourteen Amendment rights, but the mother 
later dropped her First Amendment claim.309  For purposes of this discourse the important 
allegation was that “as a ‘mature minor,’ [Greg] was denied his procedural due process rights to 
refuse medical care under Georgia law.”310  The hospital and physicians, on the other hand, 
argued that “any constitutional interest in bodily self-determination Gregory Novak may have 
                                                 
304 Id..  
305 A guardian ad litem is appointed by a court to appear in a lawsuit or on behalf of an incompetent or minor party.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 313 (7th ed. 1999). 
306 Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 846 F.Supp. 1559, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
307 Id..   
308 Id..   
309 In a footnote the court noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Prince was “dispositive of any deprivation of 
religious freedom claim” the mother might have had.  Id. at 1571 n.16.  
310 Id. at 1574.   
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possessed did not include the right to refuse medically necessary treatment and that Georgia law 
includes no provision for ‘mature minors’ to refuse medical treatment.”311
 The district court noted that minors do have constitutional rights, but added that Greg and 
his counsel pointed to no authority for the proposition that a mature minor “has a constitutional 
right to refuse a blood transfusion pursuant to either the minor’s First or Fourteenth Amendment 
rights; nor could they.”312  This is an important distinction.  The cases that have adopted the 
mature minor doctrine have done so under state law, not federal constitutional law.  The United 
States Supreme Court has yet to extend constitutional protection to minors in the medical setting 
beyond the abortion context.313  Therefore, Greg was required to show that Georgia state law 
supported his claim. 
 In attempt to find support in state law, Greg pointed to statutory exceptions to the general 
rule that minors cannot consent to medical treatment.314  The court noted that under Georgia 
statutory law, only those over the age of eighteen are expressly permitted to refuse medical 
treatment; such that, although minors are empowered to consent to certain treatments, they are 
not statutorily permitted to refuse the same.315  The court concluded that there was no authority 
to suggest that Georgia recognizes a common law mature minor doctrine.316  A similar decision 
was recently reached by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a case with unusual facts.  
  
                                                 
311 Id.. 
312 Id..  Recall that the appellate court in In re E.G. found just that, but the supreme court later mooted that 
determination by acknowledging a state common law mature minor doctrine. 
313 See supra Part III. 
314 Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 846 F.Supp. 1559, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1994); see also supra Part III. 
315 Novak, 846 F.Supp. at 1576.  But see In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Mass. 1999) (In a case with similar 
facts – Rena, a Jehovah’s Witness, lacerated her spleen in a snowboarding accident potentially requiring blood 
transfusions, and the trial court gave the hospital permission to administer them should they become necessary – the 
highest court in Maine stated that the adolescent’s maturity should be determined to ascertain whether she could 
make an informed choice). 
316 Id..  The district court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.  Novak, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996).  It should be 
noted, however, that a Georgia state court has yet to make a determination about whether the state actually does 
acknowledge the mature minor doctrine. 
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D. COMMONWEALTH V. NIXON317
 
In June of 1997 sixteen-year-old Shannon Nixon began feeling ill.318  As members of the Faith 
Tabernacle Church, the Nixon’s did not believe in traditional medical treatment, choosing 
instead to address illness through spiritual treatment.319  They began to pray for Shannon’s 
health, and took her to their Church to be anointed.  Initially, Shannon’s condition appeared to 
improve, but it subsequently deteriorated and she slipped into a coma.  She died a few hours later 
from what an autopsy later determined to be diabetes acidosis: a “treatable, though not curable, 
condition.”320
 Shannon’s parents were subsequently tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
and endangering the welfare of a child; for which they were sentenced to two and a half to five 
years in prison and a fine of one thousand dollars.321  They appealed the conviction claiming in 
relevant part that (1) Shannon had a constitutionally protected privacy right to refuse medical 
treatment; and (2) Shannon was a mature minor capable of making the decision to refuse 
treatment herself.322   
 Shannon’s parents raised these arguments to suggest that Shannon was mature enough to 
make a protected decision, therefore abrogating their parental duty.323  In other words, that 
Shannon’s decision was her own, and that they merely respected that decision because she was 
mature enough to make it herself.  Without any reported analysis, the superior court held that 
                                                 
317 761 A.2d 1151, (Pa. 2000); 718 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
318 Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1152.  
319 Id..  Note the contrast between these beliefs and those of Jehovah’s Witnesses who will seek medical care except 
for blood transfusions. 
320 Id..  The facts are unusual, because in nearly all other reported cases of children dying when their parents refuse 
to seek medical attention, the children were very young; thus precluding application of the mature minor doctrine.  
See Merrick, supra note 1, at 290-97 (2003) (detailing cases that reached state Supreme Courts.  Other than 
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321 Commonwealth  v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
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Id..  
323 Id. at 313. 
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Shannon, “as a mature minor, had a right to refuse medical treatment pursuant to her 
constitutional right to privacy.”324  It went on to state, however, that “this right does not 
discharge her parents’ duty to override her decision when her life is in immediate danger.”325
 The court interpreted In re Green to suggest that a sixteen-year-old is permitted to refuse 
a non life-threatening operation for religious beliefs,326 but said that a different result is 
warranted where the minor’s life is in danger.327  The court further considered its earlier decision 
in Commonwealth v. Cottam,328 where the parents of two malnourished children argued that the 
fourteen and twelve-year-olds chose not to eat based on their own religious beliefs.  The Cottam 
court held that “even if [the children] were considered mature enough to freely exercise their 
religious beliefs, this does not dispel [defendant’s] duty while the children are in their care, 
custody and control to provide them with parental care, direction and sustenance.”329
 Finally, the court recalled its holding in Commonwealth v. Barnhart,330 where it upheld 
the conviction of parents belonging to the Nixons’ Religion who relied solely on spiritual healing 
to treat their two-year old son’s cancer.331  In Barnhart, the court held that all parents in 
Pennsylvania owe a duty of care to their children, “at the very least, to avert the child’s untimely 
death.”332  In ruling against the Nixons, the Superior Court held that even though Shannon was a 
                                                 
324 Id..  The Pennsylvania Superior Court, like the Illinois Appellate Court, took it upon itself to extend 
constitutional rights to minors for medical decision-making beyond the abortion context. 
325 Id..  
326 This interpretation is not entirely accurate.  See supra Part II.   
327 Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
328 616 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).   
329 Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313 (quoting Cottam, 616 A.2d at 1000).  Importantly, the Cottam court did not make an 
actual determination as to the ability of fourteen and twelve-year-olds to exercise their religious beliefs; rather it 
held that children may never exercise religious beliefs where to do so would result in death. 
330 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
331 Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313. 
332 Id. (citing Barnhart 497 A.2d at 621).  See also supra Parts II & III. 
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mature minor, this did not abrogate their parental duty to seek medical treatment once her 
condition became life threatening.333
 The court held that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not excessive despite the 
fact that it exceeded the sentencing guidelines.334  Of particular import was the fact that the 
Nixons were tried six years earlier on the same charges when their nine-year-old son died of 
complications arising from an ear infection.  In that case the Nixons pled no contest and received 
two years of probation.335  The Nixons appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 The supreme court granted allocatur to consider two issues: (1) whether to adopt a 
“mature minor doctrine which would be an affirmative defense to the parental duty to provide 
care to a minor;” and (2) “whether Shannon Nixon had a right to refuse medical care pursuant to 
her privacy rights under the constitutions of the United States and [Pennsylvania].”336
 The supreme court reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions that acknowledged the 
mature minor doctrine,337 and stated that “without passing judgment upon the wisdom of the 
mature minor doctrine itself,” the doctrine is inapplicable to the circumstances surrounding the 
Nixons’ case.338  In the court’s opinion, the doctrine was inapplicable because “the legislature of 
[Pennsylvania] has provided a statute which identifies those minors who are deemed sufficiently 
mature to give consent to medical treatment.”339  
The court also relied on Pennsylvania’s adoption of the treatment exceptions,340 to conclude that 
these statutes when read together suggest that the legislature did not intend “that any minor, upon 
the slightest showing, has capacity to consent to or to refuse medical treatment in a life and death 
                                                 
333 Id. at 313. 
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336 Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Pa. 2000). 
337 See infra Part III and above, discussing the history and development of the mature minor doctrine. 
338 Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1154. 
339 Id. at 1155.  Referring to status exceptions.  See supra Part III.   
340 Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1155. 
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situation.”341  Interestingly, the court’s stated holding was that “the maturity of an 
unemancipated minor is not an affirmative defense to the charges brought against Appellants.”342
 Recall above where the court initially framed this issue as whether it would adopt a 
mature minor doctrine which would be an affirmative defense to the parental duty to provide 
care to a minor.  There is an obvious difference, however, between a wholesale refusal to adopt 
the mature minor doctrine, and simply refusing to allow the mature minor doctrine to be utilized 
as an affirmative defense after the fact when parents refuse to seek out medical care and a child 
dies.  In a powerful concurrence, Justice Cappy believed the majority opinion to effect the 
former.343   
Although agreeing with the ruling in the Nixons’ case, Justice Cappy would have adopted 
a mature minor doctrine in Pennsylvania.  In his opinion, “when it is determined that a minor has 
the capacity to understand the nature of his or her condition, appreciate the consequences of the 
choices he or she makes, and reach a decision regarding medical intervention in a responsible 
fashion, he or she should have the right to consent to or refuse treatment.”344  Cappy felt that the 
record fell short of establishing Shannon as a mature minor, but conceivably, she could have 
been found mature enough to make the decision for herself.345  Following Nixon, like Georgia, 
Pennsylvania does not acknowledge decision-making authority for mature minors under any 
                                                 
341 Id..  In a footnote the court cited to the superior court’s statement in Cottam, that even if a minor were found to 
be mature enough to freely exercise their religious beliefs, it would not abrogate the parents’ affirmative duty to 
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privacy rights protected by both the state and federal constitutions, those rights were overridden by the compelling 
state interest as parens partriae to protect the life of an unemancipated minor.  Id. at 1156. 
343 Id. at 1157 (Cappy, J. concurring).  Justice Cappy felt that the majority opinion was “ambiguous,” but after 
“deliberation” ultimately concluded that “the majority has evaluated the [mature minor] doctrine and determined 
that it will not be part of our common law under any circumstances.” Id..  
344 Id. at 1158.  The Superior Court, on the other hand, would never allow a minor to refuse medical treatment where 
death is the probable outcome. 
345 Id..  
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circumstances not previously existing under statutory law.  Justice Cappy aligned himself with 
the cases endorsing the doctrine, and felt that this was the wrong result.   
Review of the aforementioned cases reveals several important implications.  First, the 
mature minor doctrine has yet to be fully developed or consistently applied.  Some courts have 
deferred adoption of the doctrine to State Legislature, preferring to stay out of the debate 
entirely.  Other courts have extended decision-making authority to minors for the purpose of 
consenting to, but not refusing medical treatment.  Still others would allow minors adjudged 
mature to refuse even life-saving medical treatment if they had agreement from their parents.   
Second, although all courts willing to entertain the mature minor doctrine speak of the 
minors’ ability to understand their circumstances and appreciate the consequences of their 
decisions, none provide specific guidelines for measuring the capacity of minors to do so.  In 
addition, the courts do not recognize a significant difference between the refusal of and consent 
to medical treatment, especially where the consequences are life or death in nature.  Ethically 
speaking, a higher level of competence is required to refuse than consent to such treatment.346  
The cases dealing with the mature minor doctrine in situations involving life or death decisions 
are deficient in their discussions regarding whether minors are in fact capable of choosing to 
refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment in accordance with their underlying and 
enduring aims and values. 
 Finally, the cases in this area involving religious determinations by adolescents pay 
disturbingly little attention to the religious aspect of the decision-making process.  While the 
courts are clear that they will not let parents make the decision to refuse life-saving or sustaining 
                                                 
346 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 52 (arguing that “the appropriate level of competence properly required 
for a particular decision must be adjusted to the consequences of acting on that decision”).  This will be discussed 
further in Part V. 
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medical treatment on behalf of their children based upon religious beliefs, they do not make a 
serious attempt to explicate the religious identity of the minors in question. 
The goal of the mature minor doctrine is to ascertain those adolescents who have 
developed underlying and enduring aims and values, and thus, the capability of making decisions 
that would promote their well-being without the aid of their parents or the State.  Under the 
current framework, it is possible that a minor could be permitted to refuse live-saving or 
sustaining medical treatment based upon religious beliefs because they understand and 
appreciate the medical aspects of their situation, yet do not have authentic beliefs that are integral 
to their lives.  This is a dangerous precedent. 
For instance, the trial court believed that Ernestine was mature enough to understand the 
medical nature of her condition, but was concerned that her expressed religious beliefs were not 
necessarily her own.  In extending decisional authority to Ernestine, the majority opinions from 
the appellate courts in Illinois down played the religious aspect of the decision by emphasizing 
her maturity with respect to the medical aspects of the decision.347  Further, Justice Cappy 
implied in his concurrence that if Shannon had understood the nature of her condition and 
appreciated the consequences of her decision, she should have been permitted to refuse medical 
treatment.  This ignores the possibility that Shannon may have been impermissibly influenced by 
her parents and religious community in coming to a refusal decision in contravention of her true 
sense of well-being.  Disregarding the religious aspect of the decision-making process leaves 
open the possibility that practitioners will allow adolescents to choose to die for their expressed 
beliefs in a way that fails to protect and promote the adolescents’ well-being.     
                                                 
347 The trial court in New York indicated the same anxiety when it declared Philip immature, though it did not 
expressly identify its reasoning for this finding.  The court did note that there was no indication that Philip was 
encouraged to make the decision on his own.  See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
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Another possibility under the current status of the law is that minors with deeply held 
religious convictions will be prevented from acting according to their beliefs in violation of their 
autonomy.  For instance, it is conceivable that Gregory Novak was deeply committed to his 
beliefs, so much so, that forcing him to undergo a blood transfusion would compromise his 
religious integrity.  The district court’s wholesale rejection of the mature minor doctrine with 
respect to treatment refusals fails to adequately protect the potential that Gregory’s decision was 
ethically deserving of respect as autonomous.   
Acknowledging that the current framework is wanting, but that the mature minor doctrine 
has merit, this paper now turns to whether the doctrine should be utilized to permit adolescents to 
refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based upon religious beliefs.  In other words, is 
it possible to measure the religious integrity of adolescents to the point where it is ethically 
defensible to allow them to die for their expressed beliefs?     
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V.  RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY AND MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
 
Situations involving the refusal of medical treatment based upon religious beliefs are not simply 
medical in nature, and therefore, addressing the patient’s understanding of the medical aspect of 
the decision alone is insufficient.  In fact, in the cases presented in this paper, the decisions to 
refuse medical treatment were based solely or primarily upon religious beliefs.  The parents of 
Kevin Sampson, Ricky Green, Ernestine Gregory and Philip Malcolm consented to medical 
procedures aimed at alleviating their children’s ailments.348  These decisions were medical in 
nature taking into account – assuming informed consent was obtained – diagnoses, risks and the 
potential for success associated with the procedures, and feasible alternatives.349   
The parents of Kevin and Ricky were willing to subject their children to risky surgical 
procedures, though their lives were not at risk from the underlying condition, in the hopes that 
they would have a better life.  The parents of Ernestine and Philip wanted their children to 
undergo cancer treatments despite the fact that the cure rate was no higher than twenty-five 
percent.  The refusal of these treatments was not based upon relative risk or success; rather the 
parents refused based upon their religious prohibition on the administration of blood 
transfusions.   
 It is well settled that parents may not refuse medical treatment based upon religious 
beliefs where to do so would put their children’s lives at risk; the State as parens patriae has the 
                                                 
348 Shannon Nixon’s parents, on the other hand, refused all medical treatment. 
349 See supra Part II. 
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duty to intervene and order the necessary treatment.350  Again, this intervention is based upon the 
presumption that adults may choose to die for their beliefs, but they may not “make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make 
that choice for themselves.”351  While the parents may believe that death furthers their own and 
their children’s well-being more so than would the given medical treatment, the State reserves 
that determination for the child upon reaching decision-making capacity.  In order to avoid this 
interference, some parents and children have argued that the decisions were made by the children 
as mature minors; and as such, with the full and legal discretion to decide for themselves.   
 In theory, the mature minor doctrine requires ascertaining whether adolescents  have 
developed underlying and enduring aims and values, and thus, decision-making capacity or the 
ability to make autonomous decisions.  When adolescents are willing to die for their religious 
beliefs, an inquiry is required not just into the ability of the minors to appreciate their medical 
circumstances, but also into their religious integrity.  Only then can practitioners be sure that the 
decisions are the adolescents’ own.   
 
A. CONSIDERATION OF ADOLESCENT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN THE LAW 
 
The maturity of minors is given relatively little weight in the context of children’s religious 
rights.352  Most cases even addressing the religious rights of minors involve situations where the 
“children’s interests identified match the parents’ interests, or indeed, the parents are the actual 
motivating force behind the litigation.”353  The courts deciding these cases frequently do not 
distinguish between the religious interests of the parents and their children, leading some 
                                                 
350 See supra Part II. 
351 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
352 Note, Children as Believers: Minors’ Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of Religious Development, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2208 (2002) [hereinafter Children as Believers]. 
353 Buss, supra note 71, at 62. 
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commentators to believe that the cases are decided solely upon the parents’ claims.354  Where the 
courts attempt to disaggregate the interests of the parents and children, scant attention is paid to 
the centrality of the children’s religious beliefs to their lives.  
It is fitting to return to Justice Douglas’s partial dissent in Yoder.  Indeed, Douglas 
partially dissented from the majority’s opinion because only two of the three children were not 
consulted regarding their religious views and preference to withdraw from school after the eighth 
grade.355  Frieda Yoder, on the other hand, gave testimony that she wanted to withdraw from 
school.  That testimony, in relevant part, is as follows:  
Q: [by parents’ counsel]: Frieda, I won’t ask you many questions, how old are you? 
A: 15 
Q: Do you believe in the Amish religion? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you want to live according to the way of your people? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you live that way now? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Would your going to high school be against your religious belief, Frieda? 
A: Yes. 
That is All. 
Q: [by counsel for the State] Defense counsel asked, and I think you said that you wanted 
to be brought up in the Amish religion, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Now Frieda, otherwise you would be able to attend high school physically, if you 
were free of religion you could attend, you could walk or get there on the bus? 
A: Yes 
Q: So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going to school, and did not go to 
school since last September, is because of your religion? 
A: Yes 
That is all.356
 
Douglas wrote his dissent because he was concerned that the majority’s opinion served to 
“impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children,” without discerning the 
children’s actual religious convictions.357  Apparently, Frieda’s testimony was sufficient to dispel 
his concerns and convince him of the depth of Frieda’s beliefs such that she was “mature enough 
                                                 
354 Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2210 (citing Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of 
Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1240 n.22 (2000)). 
355 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
356 Buss, supra note 71, at n.61.   
357 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242. 
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to have [her] desire respected.”358  Because Douglas’s dissent was grounded on the fact that the 
other two children were not consulted, presumably, had they been asked questions similar to 
Frieda, he would have joined the majority opinion.   
 For obvious reasons, this inquiry provides little guidance concerning the authenticity of a 
child’s religious beliefs.  It is unclear from a few yes/no questions whether the choice to leave 
school was formulated by Frieda on her own, without undue influence or pressure from her 
parents or religious community.  The decision to withdraw from school has less severe 
consequences than a life or death decision to refuse medical treatment, and would require a lesser 
showing of competency, but Frieda’s limited testimony fails to supply even this.  Since Yoder, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has not offered further guidance concerning adolescent 
religious claims.   
In 1993 a district court in Texas decided an interesting case involving Native American 
students.359  Although the members of the Tribes in question converted to Christianity years 
before, certain younger members returned to some of the traditional ways, including wearing 
their hair long.360  The school dress code prohibited boys from wearing their hair longer than 
their shirt collar, and the students were punished for violating it.  The students and their parents 
brought suit raising violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.361
 As practicing Christians, the boys’ parents did not require them to wear their hair long, 
but they did support their desire to do so.  The court detailed testimony from two boys in 
particular who indicated that wearing long hair was part of their Native American heritage, and 
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360 Id. at 1325. 
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both participated in ceremonial dances.362  With this information the court concluded that the 
boys had sincerely held religious beliefs worthy of protection.  The court also found in favor of 
the parents’ claim relating to their right to direct their children’s religious training.363   
 The Big Sandy court appeared to give great weight to the religious beliefs presented by 
the boys as evidence of the sincerity of their beliefs.  On the other hand, the “court assigned 
substantial weight to the parents’ support of their children’s religious practices,”364 decreasing 
the authority of the children’s independent religious decision. 
 One of the most oft-cited cases in recent literature365 on the ability of children to assert 
independent religious beliefs was decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.366  Zummo 
involved a custody dispute between a Jewish mother and a Roman Catholic father.367  The 
mother was awarded primary custody, but the couple went to court regarding a dispute about the 
father’s wish to take the children to Catholic services, and his complaint that taking the children 
to Jewish Sunday School diminished his visitation time.368
 The trial court entered an order preventing the father from controlling his children’s 
religious education, holding that the “children had been "assiduously" grounded in the Jewish 
faith, and the children should be permitted to continue in "their chosen faith."”369  The superior 
court disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the children, then aged three, four and eight, 
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“chose” Judaism as their faith, and thus “asserted personal religious identities which were 
entitled to consideration and protection.”370
 Significantly, the court noted that “parents and religious leaders define a child's religious 
identity under the rules of the religion they practice,” and “often such rules impose a presumed 
religious identity upon a child without requiring the child's consent or understanding, on the 
basis of a parent's religion.”371  In light of this the court went on to state that “courts only 
recognize a legally cognizable religious identity when such an identity is asserted by the child 
itself, and then only if the child has reached sufficient maturity and intellectual development to 
understand the significance of such an assertion.”372  Although the Pennsylvania court speaks to 
a notion of religious identity, because the children were so young, it did not specifically address 
what the children would have had to show to establish independent, cognizable religious 
rights.373
 A seemingly contrary result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Cheema v. Thompson.374  
In this case three Khalsa Sikh children and their parents sought a preliminary injunction against 
the weapons ban utilized by the children’s school as applied to their wearing of ceremonial 
knives called kirpans.375  One of the central tenets of the Sikh religion is to wear five symbols of 
the faith at all time.376  In upholding the district court’s grant of the injunction, the circuit court 
did not clearly disaggregate the religious interests of the parents and children.  Without pointing 
to any specific facts in the record, however, the majority of the court suggested that the children 
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had proved that “their insistence on wearing kirpans was animated by a sincere 
religious belief.”377
 In a powerful dissent, Judge Wiggins immediately pointed out that the children in 
question were aged seven, eight and ten-years-old.378  He expressed concern that although the 
religion dictates that kirpans may only be used in “self defense and the propagation of justice,” 
the record indicated that the children had been seen playing with their knives, and in at least one 
instance a Cheema child threatened to use his knife against another student.379  Judge Wiggins 
agreed with the district court’s initial finding that “[n]othing in the present record suggests that 
the instruction or advisement given to these children prior to their initiation as Khalsa Sikhs, or 
that their oath of religion, would divest them of the demeanor, maturity and judgment which 
equate with their childhood.”380  In other words, substantial evidence weighed against a finding 
that the children had sincerely held beliefs which they fully understood and could apply to their 
life-plan. 
 The limited cases addressing the religious expression of children are as inconsistent and 
provide as little guidance as those involving the mature minor doctrine.  The decisions in the 
aforementioned cases imply that certain children are capable of establishing their own 
independent religious identities; and although the courts suggest notions of sincerity and 
maturity, they do not provide guidance as to accurate measures of the same.  That being said, the 
majority opinion in Zummo, and Judge Wiggins’s dissent in Cheema at least attempt to establish 
a conception of religious identity for minors.  The opinions point to the intellectual development 
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of the children in question as well as their understanding of how religious beliefs shape various 
life activities and decisions.   
The thesis of this paper is that only adolescents demonstrating authentic, sincerely held 
religious beliefs that are central to their lives should be permitted to refuse life-saving or 
sustaining medical treatment based upon those beliefs, thus dying for them.  It is necessary to 
ensure that adolescents are choosing to die for their own values rather than those of third parties.  
Recall that in Part I of this paper three capacities were listed as necessary for decision-making 
competence; the third being the capacity to have and apply a set of values.   
The set of values in question must be relative to a particular decision, and “at least 
minimally consistent, stable, and affirmed as his or her own.”381  When the values are religious 
in nature, and the particular decision involves a life or death determination, minimal stability of 
beliefs affirmed as one’s own necessitates a finding of religious integrity.  In this way, 
practitioners can be sure that the adolescent is not mistaken about what will best satisfy his or her 
underlying aims and values; and therefore, that the decision is in accord with his or her 
conception of well-being. 
 
B. RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY 
 
At the outset it should be noted that expressly sincere religious beliefs are not necessarily 
integral and defining in a person’s life.382  This is important because the Supreme Court of the 
United States is largely deferential to the expressed sincerity of an adult’s religious beliefs in its 
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Free Exercise jurisprudence.383  When an adolescent seeks to die for his or her religious values, 
the State’s duty as parens patriae mandates the presentation of more than a mere expression of 
sincerely held beliefs.   
1. Characteristics of Religious Integrity 
Integrity in personal values refers to “soundness, reliability, wholeness, and integration of moral 
character;” to “fidelity in adherence to moral norms.”384  Those with religious integrity have 
integrated their religious beliefs into a coherent sense of self, and live in a way that is faithful to 
their deeply held values.  In this way, their beliefs become “integral to [their] self-conception or 
identity.”385  Conversely, persons without religious integrity demonstrate a “lack of sincerely 
held, fundamental moral convictions,” and thus act in a way that is inconsistent with firmly held 
moral convictions.386   
Individuals often justify actions or refusals to act on the ground that to do otherwise 
would sacrifice their integrity.387  In other words, that their underlying and enduring aims and 
values shape their identity and guide every aspect of their life, such that requiring them to act 
contrary would be a gross violation of their autonomy.  The refusal of medical treatment based 
upon religious beliefs is akin to an objection based upon the person’s conscience.    
 When individuals refuse to act in a certain prescribed way, they do so under what is 
commonly referred to as conscientious objection.  For instance, physicians may seek to avoid 
performing controversial procedures such as an abortion or participating in physician assisted 
suicide when patients so request.  Refusing to treat the patient could be viewed as a violation of 
                                                 
383 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988).  Simply put, those with 
sincere religious beliefs know and adhere to the tenets of their faith which guide their lives.    Courts are largely 
deferential to litigants claiming to be religiously motivated.  Id. at 1243-46. 
384 BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, supra note 24, at 35-36. 
385 Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICS 206, 214 (2000). 
386 BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, supra note 24, at 36. 
387 Id. at 35.  
 70
the physician’s duty to act in the patient’s expressed best interests, but many ethicists argue that 
physicians should not be required to act in a way that violates their personal moral integrity.388  
Mark Wicclair suggests that the moral weight given to the physician’s objection is a function of 
the “centrality of the beliefs upon which they are based to the physician’s core ethical values.”389
 Another area where conscientious objection is frequently raised is in reference to military 
duty.  During the draft associated with the Vietnam War many individuals objected to joining the 
war effort based upon appeals to conscience.  The statute authorizing the draft provided an 
exception for individuals conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason 
of religious training and belief.390  In a series of cases related to conscientious objectors, the 
Supreme Court of the United States established that decisions based upon conscientious 
objection “must be sincere and not based on political grounds; nor may [they] be a simple matter 
of expediency or self-interest.”391  Further, to act “conscientiously is to act in the honest and 
sincere belief that what one is doing is morally right, even if it is illegal.”392
The language of the Court’s decision in Welsh is explicative.  Elliot Welsh attempted to 
conscientiously object to the military draft imposed during the Vietnam War, and was convicted 
for violating the statute mandating induction into the Armed Forces based upon a finding that his 
beliefs were not religious in nature.393  The Supreme Court first made clear that conscientious 
objection does not apply to “those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection 
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to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon 
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.”394
 In reversing Welsh’s conviction the Court relied on his testimony that “I believe that 
human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not injure or kill another 
human being. This belief . . . is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore, 
conscientiously comply with the Government's insistence that I assume duties which I feel are 
immoral and totally repugnant.”395  The Court was persuaded that Welsh’s convictions “were 
spurred by deeply held” moral and ethical values to the extent that requiring him to become an 
instrument of the war would give him “no rest or peace.”396  In other words, his beliefs were so 
tied to his sense of well-being that to order him to act contrary would cause “self-betrayal and 
loss of self-respect,”397 in clear violation of the his autonomy. 
 Like conscientious objectors to war, adults objecting to medical treatment based upon 
their religious convictions do so under the belief that to act otherwise would cause grave harm to 
their sense of well-being.  In choosing to die for their beliefs, these adults are presumed398 to 
have religious integrity, marked by a deeply rooted self-conception that is founded in religious 
values and is so central to the person’s life that it guides daily activities and decision-making.   
 This is different than a conception of what might be called religious maturity.  In the 
seminal work on religious maturity Gordon Allport suggested that “[s]trenuous thinking [is] 
                                                 
394 Id. at 342-43.  Further, given the presumption that adults generally act in accordance with a well-conceived life 
plan, the burden is on the government to prove that the beliefs are not sincerely held.  See Duane Zezula, Religious 
Accommodation in the Military, 1987 ARMY LAW 3, 8 (1987). 
395 Id. at 343.  
396 Id. at 344. 
397 Wicclair, supra note 385, at 214. 
398 Unlike military conscientious objection – where an inquiry into the individual’s religious integrity is triggered by 
the otherwise illegal action of avoiding military service – no inquiry into religious integrity is required when an 
adult objects to medical treatment based upon religious beliefs.  Because adolescents are presumed to lack religious 
integrity, an inquiry is mandated by the government as parens patriae. 
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demanded of every aspirant seeking religious maturity.”399  He discovered that those with 
religious maturity do not accept religion “unreflectively and uncritically;” rather, they arrive at 
their beliefs through “reflective examination and questioning.”400  Allport concluded that mature 
religious beliefs are “well differentiated, comprising many subsidiary attitudes, critically arrived 
at, and flexibly maintained as the sphere of experience widens.”401  In turn, those with religious 
maturity possess “a mature sentiment  . . . [representing] a style of existence that the individual 
has adopted after considerable reflection as a means of relating to himself.”402
 From a philosophical standpoint, the ideal may be for individuals to achieve Allport’s 
sense of religious maturity, but it is an impossibly high standard to hold the general populace.  
Indeed, he pointed to brilliant minds such as Acquinas, Luther and Kirkegaard as the epitome of 
religious maturity for which people should strive;403 and in later works he abandoned some of the 
elements he originally associated with religious maturity.404    Thus, it presents an unworkable 
standard with regard to adolescents who object to medical treatment based upon their religious 
beliefs.   
2. Adolescent Development and Religious Integrity 
Although courts seem loathe to inquire into the religious identities of children and adults, 
substantial scholarship exists contemplating religious development.405  Ronald Goldman, taking 
a clue from Piaget, mapped religious thought development onto three stages, (1) intuitive (pre-
                                                 
399 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 46 (1950). 
400 Id. at 59-60. 
401 Id. at 63. 
402 Id. at 127. 
403 Id. at 46. 
404 Leak & Fish, supra note 382, at 84. 
405 See, e.g., RONALD GOLDMAN, RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 51-67 (1964); Elizabeth 
W. Ozorak, Social and Cognitive Influences on the Development of Religious Beliefs and Commitment in 
Adolescence, 28 J. SCI. STUD. RELIG. 448 (1989); Justin L. Barrett, Do Children Experience God as Adults Do?, in 
RELIGION IN MIND 186 (Jensine Andresen ed. 2001). 
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operational); (2) concrete; and (3) abstract.406  He found that by age fourteen many adolescents 
entered the final stage, and were at least capable of more mature, abstract religious thinking.407  
Goldman acknowledged, and later studies supported, that age is not a bright line indicator of 
religious thought development.  For example, recent scholarship suggests that “[b]oth children’s 
and adults’ god concepts are limited by context demands in their cognitive complexity” such that 
the “concrete-to-abstract shift may not occur over the course of development but instead may 
manifest from one situation to another.”408
 In a 1989 study Elizabeth Ozorak theorized that “[a] model of religious development in 
adolescence should be grounded in the process of maturation, especially in cognitive changes, 
but it should also weigh the influences of the parents and their chosen religious organization (if 
any) against the more diverse influences of peers.”409  In other words, religious development 
does not occur in a vacuum; children “actively process the information they receive and draw 
inferences from it.”410  The ultimate question, then, is whether adolescents have the ability to 
express religious identities independent of third parties.  In other words, do they have the 
capability to formulate a deeply rooted self-conception that will promote their well-being based 
upon their understanding of their religious values?   
Robert Coles, a pediatric psychiatrist, performed a study involving the religious 
experiences of hundreds of children.411  Coles found that his subjects “revealed an intense 
                                                 
406 GOLDMAN, supra note 405, at 51-67. 
407 Id. at 60-61. See also Carol A. Markstrom, Religious Involvement and Adolescent Psychosocial Development, 22 
J. OF ADOLESCENCE 205, 2 (1999)(discussing the ability of adolescents to consider abstract concepts with the onset 
of formal operational thought). 
408 Barrett, supra note 405, at 187.  Justin Barrett found that although they have the capacity to think abstractly, 
when faced with difficult cognitive pressure, adults revert to simpler more anthropomorphic concepts of religious 
thought.  Id. at 186. 
409 Ozorak, supra note 405, at 448.  Ozorak points out that “Virtually all research has identified parents as the most 
important source of religious influence.”  Id. at 449. 
410 Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2224.  
411 ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (1990). 
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interest in and engagement with traditionally religious questions and concepts,” in a way that 
made their beliefs central to their lives.412  Centrality alone, however, is not sufficient.  For 
instance, the Cheema children’s religious beliefs played a central role in their lives, but that does 
not mean that the children had the cognitive capacity to establish a self identity based upon those 
beliefs.  This requires a greater degree of sophistication than younger children likely possess.  On 
the other hand, the studies reported in Part III of this paper coupled with those involving 
religious development suggest that that many adolescents have the cognitive capacity to 
formulate deeply rooted religious identities. 
An inquiry into religious integrity must seek to ascertain whether the adolescent’s beliefs 
are deeply held and tied to his or her sense of well-being.  Only then should the adolescent be 
deemed competent to make decisions based upon those beliefs.  The level of inquiry required 
depends upon the circumstances of the decision in question.   
 
 
C. COMPETENCE REQUIRED TO REFUSE LIFE-SAVING OR SUSTAINING MEDICAL 
TREATMENT BASED UPON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
 
Inquiries into religious integrity and medical decision-making competence are not mutually 
exclusive.  In fact, an “adequate standard of competence will focus primarily not on the content 
of the patient’s decision but on the process of the reasoning that leads up to that decision.”413  
Further, “setting the proper level of decision-making competence involves balancing two 
important values: protecting and promoting the individual’s well-being, and respecting the 
individual’s self-determination.” 414   
                                                 
412 Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2221. 
413 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 50. 
414 Id. at 84.  
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 Competent individuals are thought to be capable of making autonomous decisions that 
will promote their well-being.  Thus, allowing them to make their own decisions both respects 
their autonomy and protects their well-being.  Inquiries into competence are triggered by 
situations where their appears to be a conflict between persons’ decisions and their well-being.  
If individuals are making truly autonomous decisions, then they know what is in their best 
interests and the decisions should stand.   
When practitioners inquire into competence, they run the risk of two errors: (1) that 
autonomous individuals will be found incompetent, and thus have the principle of respect for 
autonomy violated when a surrogate decision-maker is appointed; or (2) that incompetent 
individuals will be permitted to make harmful, non-autonomous decisions that are contrary to 
their well-being.415  Because an individual’s conception of well-being is tied closely to his or her 
religious beliefs, part of the competency determination will rest upon the integrity of those 
beliefs.416    
This being said, Buchanan and Brock suggest two central questions for a process standard 
of competence: (1) “how well must the patient understand and reason to be competent?” and (2) 
“how certain must those persons evaluating competence be about how well the patient has 
understood and reasoned in coming to a decision?”417  As the level of competence increases so 
too does the level of certainty required.418  
 Recall that determining a person’s competence is an inquiry into “a particular person’s 
capacity to perform a particular decision-making task at a particular time and under specified 
                                                 
415 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 40-41. 
416 A process standard of competence takes reasoning into account during the competency determination.  This is 
different than first evaluating competency and then inquiring into the rationality of the given choice.  Charles Culver 
and Bernard Gert advocate the latter position, whereby a competent person’s decision may be overridden if found to 
be irrational.  Id. at 65-68.  From a legal standpoint this approach is troubling given the great deal of decision-
making protection offered to competent individuals.  See supra Part I.   
417 Id. at 51. 
418 Id. at 85. 
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conditions.”419  For purposes of this paper, the task involves the refusal of medical treatment 
based upon religious beliefs.  Ethically speaking this is important because the competencies 
required to consent to and refuse medical treatment are not necessarily equivalent.   
Buchanan and Brock suggest a sliding scale, and supply this example, “consent to a low-
risk life-saving procedure by an otherwise healthy individual should require only a minimal level 
of competence, but refusal of that same procedure by such an individual should require the 
highest level of competence.”420  Put another way, “the greater the risk relative to other 
alternatives – where risk is a function of the severity of the expected harm and the probability of 
its occurrence – the greater the level of communication, understanding, and reasoning skills 
required for competence to make that decision.”421   
Inherent to any sliding scale approach to competence is the potential for abuse from 
practitioners.  For instance, one evaluating competence could set the standard so high or low that 
no person or any person – autonomous or not – could meet it.  In this way, the practitioner would 
promote his or her own values, rather than those of the individual in question.  Acknowledging 
that no test of competence is without error, the sliding scale attempts to err (above) on the side 
that is more ethically defensible.   
Those evaluating the competence of individuals in these circumstances are looking for 
two possible defects that would preclude an autonomous decision: 1) the patient’s lack of 
understanding of the relevant information, and/or 2) where the choice is not based upon the 
person’s underlying and enduring aims and values.422  The latter is implicated more significantly 
                                                 
419 Id. at 18.  See also supra Part I. 
420 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 52. 
421 Id. at 55.  But see BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, supra note 24, at 76 (arguing that the level of competency 
required should increase with complexity, not necessarily risk).  For purposes of this paper it will be presumed that 
decisions regarding life, death, and eternal existence are inherently risky and complex, thus requiring a very high 
level of competence under either view. 
422 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 34, at 56. 
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when adolescents’ refusal decisions are made in relation to religious beliefs.  An inquiry into 
religious integrity would address the issue of whether the adolescent’s decision is truly based 
upon his or her underlying values, and as such supportive of his or her true sense of well-being. 
When adolescents choose to die for their religious beliefs rather than accept medical 
treatment, they are making decisions that their well-being would better be served through death.  
By definition, death precludes the further “deliberation, choice and action that normal humans 
possess,” that “make it possible for them to form, revise over time, and pursue in action a 
conception of their own good.”423  In other words, under error (2), if a low standard of religious 
maturity is required, it is possible that allowing the adolescent to make a non-autonomous 
decision to die would fail to protect and promote his or her overall, lifetime well-being.  The goal 
is to avoid error where possible, but if an error must be made, this would be a greater harm than 
failing to respect the adolescents’ potential autonomy under error (1); thus justifying a higher 
level of competence.424        
The answer to the authors’ first question then, is that when adolescents attempt to refuse 
life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based upon religious beliefs, where death is the 
expected outcome, a very high level of competence, marked by a showing of religious integrity, 
is required.  Further, given the severity of harm associated with refusing life-saving or sustaining 
medical treatment, and the high level of competence required to do so, persons evaluating 
competence should be convinced by a showing of clear and convincing evidence of the 
adolescent’s understanding of the medical aspects of the decision and his or her religious 
integrity.  
 
                                                 
423 Id. at 38. 
424 Note that for adults the paramount principle is respecting autonomy.  Thus, the presumption is that violation of 
the adult’s self-determination is potentially more harmful.   
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D. IMPLICATIONS: UTILIZING THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE WHEN 
ADOLESCENTS REFUSE LIFE-SAVING OR SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT 
BASED UPON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
 
To date, the cases that have dealt with the mature minor doctrine are unclear in the extent to 
which they empower adolescents adjudged mature.  Several cases limited the decision-making 
authority of the adolescents to situations where they had agreement from their parents.425  In the 
religious context this is problematic.   
Recall that the mature minor doctrine was utilized in the religious based refusal cases in 
an attempt to avoid state intervention triggered by the parents’ refusal of medical treatment on 
behalf of their children.  It is obvious in these cases that the parents both shared, and in fact 
inculcated these religious beliefs in their children.426  Therefore, the parents’ agreement with 
their children’s decisions should not be taken as dispositive of the children’s independent 
religious identity. 
Cases could also arise in which the parents disagree with their child’s decision to refuse 
medical treatment based upon the child’s expressed religious beliefs.  At most, the parents’ 
agreement or disagreement should be evidence taken into account by the fact finder in 
determining the adolescent’s competence.  The principle behind the mature minor doctrine is to 
ascertain those minors capable of making autonomous decisions on their own, thus obviating the 
need for protection from either their parents or the State.  Requiring parental consent does not 
further the goal of the mature minor doctrine. 
The ultimate question, then, and one that needs further study, is what type of inquiry is 
required to ascertain the integrity of an adolescent’s religious beliefs?  While some courts have 
suggested simply asking the child what he or she thinks, this is insufficient.  Indeed, many 
                                                 
425 See supra Parts III & IV. 
426 See Ozorak, supra note 405, at 449; Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
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children are intensely religious,427 but it does not necessarily follow that the sincerely held 
beliefs that they express are their own deeply held convictions central to their lives and sense of 
well-being.428  An inquiry into integrity should attempt to find actions by the adolescent that are 
inconsistent with firmly held moral convictions. 
For instance in one reported case, an adolescent and his mother attempted to refuse 
treatment for a sexually transmitted disease based upon their religious belief in faith healing.429  
The court ordered the treatment based on public health concerns, obviating the need to address 
J.J.’s religious basis for the refusal.430  If his religious convictions were tested, one has to wonder 
how central his beliefs were to his self-conception of well-being.  Suppose J.J.’s religion 
prohibited fornication, this would certainly be evidence against a finding that his beliefs were 
central and guiding in every aspect of his life.  One would have to question why certain tenets 
are worth upholding, but others not.   
Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court is hesitant to inquire into the 
depth of an adult’s religious beliefs.431  The presumption being, that adults are competent to 
make decisions, religious or not, in ways that promote their well-being.  The opposite 
presumption applies to minors, such that courts cannot avoid an inquiry into the sincerity and 
depth of their beliefs, especially when they seek to die for them.  By way of guidance, Major 
Duane Zezula points to legal commentators who suggest that an inquiry into religious sincerity 
look to “the history of subscription to a given belief or consistent acts according to the 
conscientiously motivated principles; external indices, such as the [individual's] demeanor or the 
                                                 
427 David Elkind, Religious Development in Adolescence, 22 J. ADOL. 291, 293 (1999). 
428 Recall that children obtain their initial beliefs from their parents and possibly religious ministers.  See Ozorak, 
supra note 405, at 449; Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
429 In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ct. App. Ohio 1990). 
430 Id. at 1141. 
431 See supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
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consistency of his or her current statements with prior statements and action; and examination of 
extrinsic evidence, including patterns of inconsistent activities or statements.”432
In addition, the courts should require the adolescents in question to explain the 
relationship between the centrality of their beliefs and their established sense of well-being.  
When asked about the suffering Ernestine would experience from a blood transfusion a 
Jehovah’s Witness minister likened it to that of a rape victim: “Forcing anyone to violate his 
consideration [sic] is the most painful indignity that an individual could have perpetrated against 
him.”433  In fact, the minister’s sentiment is a common argument against violating the principle 
of respect for autonomy.434  Again, however, it is only a violation if the person’s choice is truly 
autonomous; that is, based on underlying and enduring aims and values representing a true 
conception of well-being.  It is possible that Ernestine also felt this way, that was not elucidated 
at trial. 
Given the subjective nature of religious integrity, it is likely impossible to know for 
certain how central a given individual’s religious beliefs are to their identity.  However, a 
psychological inquiry is still an improvement over lawmakers guesses as to expressed religious 
sincerity,435 especially where the decision is life or death in nature.  When it comes to religious 
refusals by adolescents, “the value of the inquiry is not that it can simplify the analysis, but 
rather that it can facilitate a more intelligent consideration of the complexities.”436  Further 
research may extinguish these shortcomings.  
                                                 
432 Zezula, supra note 394, at 8.  
433 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).     
434 See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 32, at 58 (arguing that a person’s spiritual well-being is more 
important than physical well-being).  Where a patient is capable of autonomous decision-making, their decision to 
further their spiritual well-being should not be taken for granted. 
435 Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2221. 
436 Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1257 (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
When adolescents refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based upon religious beliefs, 
they must show by clear and convincing evidence that they both have understanding of the 
medical aspects of the decisions, and also that the religious beliefs upon which they are refusing 
the treatment are deeply rooted and central to their existence.  This is not to say that adolescents 
never have religious integrity; rather the concern is that the children are not expressing values 
associated with their true sense of well-being.  When adolescents seek to die for those beliefs, an 
inquiry must be made to ensure that they are expressing an independent religious identity rather 
than advancing the interests of parents or ministers.   
 Recall Julie lying awake in her dorm room grappling with her faith.  It is not the result, 
but the act of this internal, reflective struggle that is important.  As she interacts with her beliefs, 
she will establish their true role in her life, and whether they are so central that she is willing to 
risk her life for them rather than violate her conscience.  In this way she will come to an 
autonomous realization about her identity and true sense of well-being.  If, as Socrates advised, 
the unexamined life is not worth living, adolescents should be protected from choosing to die 
based upon beliefs that are not central to their lives or conceptually their own. 
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